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Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection
of Software
Kenneth W. Dam*
It is hard to think of a more “useful Art” than software.1 Tens of
millions of otherwise inert boxes sitting atop desks throughout offices,
factories and homes spring to useful life through software. Software also
makes possible a rapidly increasing set of familiar procedures in business
and daily life, from payrolls to airline reservations to video games. Many
of the machines we depend on in daily life—whether in home, office or
auto—are run through software.2
Since software is so useful, it may seem remarkable how much
controversy has surrounded the development of the intellectual property
regimes to protect it. After hesitation, software has come to receive
protection by both copyright and, to a certain extent, by patent.3 After
*Max

Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law, University of Chicago Law
School. I should like to thank, for comments on earlier versions of this paper, Douglas
Baird, Dennis Carlton, David Currie, Frank Easterbrook, William Landes, Lawrence
Lessig, Malla Pollack, and Richard Posner, as well as to express my appreciation for
support from the Law and Economics Program and The Jerome S. Weiss Faculty
Research Fund at the University of Chicago Law School.
1 See Constitution Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8, creating the constitutional basis for protection of
the “useful Arts” through patent and copyright protection.” See discussion of the
Constitutional term “useful Arts,” infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
2 Although we think of software in connection with computers, software runs many
kinds of machines (or perhaps one should say that computers no longer are always
recognizable as computers but rather are commonly built directly into other machines).
Among the kinds of machines containing software are “microwave ovens, ct scanners,
space shuttles, automobile engines, and anti-lock brake systems.” Improved Patents for
Software Urged at Second Round of Hearings, 47 BNA Patent, Trademark & Copyright J.
357 (1994). Even though some of this software is encapsulated in hardware in the form of
microcode, it remains in essence software. As such it receives the same copyright
protection as software fixed in more conventional media. nec Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q. 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int’l Business Machines, 746 F.
Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990), 770 Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
3 A number of computer software cases involve trade secret protection. This article,
however, will focus on copyright and patent. In addition, it will be concerned almost
exclusively with U.S. law. Intellectual property protection of software in other countries
has taken a variety of paths, although copyright has become the method of choice and
copyright protection is now enshrined internationally in the so-called trips agreement.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
Software protection is still grossly undeveloped in many countries. Moreover, even
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some false starts, a National Commission (contu) recommended copyright
protection,4 and Congress in effect accepted the recommendation in the
1980 amendments to the copyright statute.5 Subsequent case law was
required, however, to establish definitively that patents could also serve to
protect software-related inventions.6
I. The Controversy over Software Protection
Controversy over intellectual property protection has taken many
forms. Some of the specific issues will be explored in detail below, but for
now it is useful to identify a few interacting levels of controversy. The first
level is strictly legal. Since software, like some earlier technological
innovations with which we have since become doctrinally comfortable,
does not immediately fit into our preconceived legal categories, much ink
has been spilled, for example, over how to assure copyright protection
without allowing copyrights on ideas and the extent to which patents can
protect software as such as opposed to solely the manner in which
software operates on some physical apparatus.7
The second level of controversy applies more specifically to copyright.
A strongly held view has been that copyright is somehow inappropriate
where the law on the books promises protection, piracy remains rampant. See Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 n. 13 (5th Cir. 1988). The Business
Software Alliance estimated worldwide losses due to software piracy at $12.8billion in
1994, of which $2.2billion was attributable to the United States. The “piracy rate” (non“legal” software as a percentage of all software on the market) ranged as high as 80
percent in Japan and 99 percent in Indonesia and above 90percent in a wide variety of
third world countries, according to these estimates. Business Software Alliance, Press
release (April 27, 1994).
4 Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (1979) (hereafter “contu”).
5 contu was created in 1974 as part of the process leading to the Copyright Act of
1976. This 1976 amendment was not explicit on the subject, but the House Report stated
that “literary works” included “computer data bases, and computer programs to the
extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of original ideas,
as distinguished from the ideas themselves.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
54 (1976). contu reported in 1978 and Congress in effect accepted those recommendations
in the 1980 revision, although litigation was required to confirm definitively that computer software was protected by copyright. See Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New
Since contu, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 978-980 (1993); Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 2.15.2n. 46
(1989). See Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248-1249 (3d Cir. 1984).
6 See discussion infra notes 156-174 and accompanying text.
7 These issues will be discussed at length below.
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for software and that if the Congressional mandate to protect software
through copyright cannot be reversed, then at least that protection should
be as sharply limited. Attacks on copyright protection sometimes
emphasize its useful and indeed functional character.8 In doing so, critics
sometimes overlook the historical reality that copyright from the
beginning has applied to books even though they may be highly
functional—dictionaries, for example—and to other highly useful writings
such as maps and charts.9 Copyright protection has been accorded to the
output of several new, functionally useful technologies (notably
photographs in 1865).10 In contrast, artistic works were not protected at all
in the beginning and were first protected by a 1802 amendment, but only
to the extent of designs, prints, etchings and engravings, categories of
artistic works with pronounced technological aspects.11 Indeed, it was
only in 1870 that paintings, sculpture and similar more purely artistic
works were accorded protection.12 Thus, it can be said that the utility and
functionality of works has been at least as much an incentive as a
hindrance to Congressional inclusion of a category of works within the
sphere of copyright protection.
It is well established that the fact that a writing is useful and functional
does not preclude its protectability as a literary work and at most limits
8

See Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the
Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 471, 475-476, 507-511
(1985) and contu Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 Duke L.J. 663, 741-753; Gary R. Ignatin, Let
the Hackers Hack: Allowing the Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Programs to
Achieve Compatibility, 140 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1999-2000 n. 17, 2021 (1987). See also
Statement of Issues Presented to Conferees at the LaST Frontier Conference on Copyright
Protection of Computer Software, 30 Jurimetrics 11, 18-19 (1989).
9 The first copyright statute granted protection to “any map, chart, book or books.” 1
Stat. 124 (1790). See Blunt v. Patten, 3 Fed. Cases 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1828) (copyright upheld
for navigational charts); and David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive
Issues in the First Congress, 1989-1791, 61 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 775, 827 (1994) (“a rather
generous if appropriate interpretation of the constitutional term ‘writings’....[T]here was
no requirement in the copyright law that the author’s work be useful....” See also Jane C.
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 Col. L. Rev. 1865, 1873-1881 (1990), concerning the emphasis on
informational works in the first century of U.S. copyright.
10 13 Stat. 540. See summary of various copyright amendments in Robert A. Gorman
and Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties 7-13 (4th ed. 1993), and see Ginsburg,
supra note 9 at 1917.
11 This 1802 statute gave copyright protection to whomever “shall invent and design,
engrave, etch, or work...any historical print or other print or prints.” 2 Stat. 171.
12 16 Stat. 198, 212. Musical compositions were added in 1831. 4 Stat. 436.
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the breadth of protection.13 Nonetheless, some critics seem to hold the
implicit view that copyright should be reserved for the finer things in life,
such as poetry and creative prose—as well, of course, as academic
writings. Protecting software as a literary work seemed particularly
galling to some critics since in some forms software cannot be read by
humans, since it is intended for “reading” by machines, and since it may
someday actually be written by machines.14
The argument is occasionally heard that the usefulness of software
makes it Constitutionally inappropriate for software protection because
the Constitutional text indicates that “useful Arts” are to be protected by
patent only. This position is based on the syntactical argument that the
Constitutional text parses better when interpreted that way. The clause in
question reads: “[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” On this argument ScienceAuthors-Writings are in one bucket and useful Arts-Inventors-Discoveries
13

The Copyright Act of 1976 defines “useful article” but the function of the term is to
limit one of seven categories of “works of authorship,” namely, “pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works,” 17 U.S.C. § 102, whose definition provides that a useful article can be
such a work “only if, and only to the extent that such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. There is
no similar limitation for “literary works.” Cf. Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, 889
F.2d 197, 203 (9th Cir. 1989). And see Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int’l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 55-58, 71-72 (D. Mass. 1990). The fact that software may be
functional is only relevant, as Professor Goldstein points out, to the extent that its
functionality imposes limitations on what is included within the scope of the copyright;
to achieve functionality some parts will inevitably constitute ideas, procedures and other
unprotectable elements under § 102(b), see Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 2.15 (1989),
although the expression of those elements may be protectable.
14 Protection as a literary work does not imply that software is literature. The House
Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 made clear that the term “literary works” did not
“connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative value; it includes catalogs,
dictionaries, and similar factual, reference or instructional works and compilations of
data.” H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 54. It went on to say that literary works
included computer software only to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the
programmer’s expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.
Ibid. Many forms of functional writings have long been protected; for example, in Reiss
v. Nat’l Quotation Bureau Inc., 276 Fed. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), Judge Learned Hand held
that a code book containing 6,325 coined, meaningless words was entitled to copyright
protection.
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are in an entirely different bucket.15 Uncritical acceptance of this
syntactical argument could lead to the conclusion that the fact that
something is a “useful Art” means that it may only be patented and not
copyrighted.16
This syntactical argument does not, however, appear to comport with
the usage of the Founders. For example, in 1783 the Continental Congress
appointed a committee, including James Madison, to determine “the most
proper means of cherishing genius and useful arts...by securing to authors
or publishers of new books” a property right.17 Not surprisingly, it was
clear to Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., that the term “useful Arts” refers, among
other things, to copyright and hence circus posters could be copyrighted.18
The syntactical argument reserving “useful Arts” to patents alone is
further weakened by the inconvenient fact that “invention” was early
used to refer not just to what was patentable but also what was
copyrightable. The 1802 Act extending copyright protection to the output
of a technology—there prints—provided that “he who shall invent...any
historical or other print” shall be entitled to a copyright.19 After copyright
protection was extended in 1865 to another technology—photography—it
was natural for the Supreme Court to refer to a photograph of Oscar
Wilde as the “product of...intellectual invention” and therefore
copyrightable.20 Consequently, the Supreme Court today has no difficulty
15

See Paul Goldstein, Copyright §1.01note 1 (1989) and Infodeck, Inc. v. MeredithWebb Printing Co., 830 F.Supp. 614 (N.D. Ga. 1993). Contra: Lyman Ray Patterson,
Copyright in Historical Perspective 193 (1968) and three recent Supreme Court cases
cited infra note 21. See also William F. Patry, Latman’s The Copyright Law 17 n. 4 (1986).
16 Even if one were to accept this syntactical argument, software would of course still
be protected under the “Science-Authors-Writings” alternative. The point of the analysis
in the text is simply to show that an attack on copyright protection for software based on
its utility misconstrues the Constitution.
17 William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, Vol. I, p. 484 (1953).
(Emphasis added). A 1786 North Carolina copyright statute made clear that among the
purposes of copyright was “to promote useful discoveries.” Library of Congress,
Copyright Enactments 15 (1963). Patterson, supra note 15 at 187.
18 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
19 2 Stat. 171 (emphasis supplied). See discussion of the 1802 Act supra note 11and
accompanying text. See also the use in 1782 of the word “invention” in connection with
copyright protection for books intended for primary school education in Jane C.
Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and
America, 64 Tulane L. Rev. 991, 1000 (1990).
20 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) Accord: Yuengling
v. Schile, 12 Fed. 97, 100 (1882) (only “authors and inventors” entitled to copyright). In
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in repeatedly stating that the purpose of copyright law includes the
promotion of both “Science” and “useful Arts.”21
The conclusion that the usefulness of software is an argument for,
rather than against, copyright protection of software is thus fully justified
not just by the history of the copyright laws but also by the text of the
Constitution when read in the light of the usage of the Constitutional
terms by the Founders at the time of the drafting and by both the
Congress and the Supreme Court in the century that followed.22
II. A Brief History of Computer Practices and Terminology
A third, and reinforcing, level of controversy has to do with the
software industry itself. This critical perspective, which emphasizes the
special nature of that industry and the sociology of software writers, has
burst into prominence with the rapidly growing popularity of personal
computers. The idea has spread that consumers and the software industry
itself would benefit if popular software products could be readily
replicated by competitors. Under this view broad copyright protection is
bad policy to the extent that it reduces the ability to replicate such
products. As we shall see, this idea is often discussed under the rubric of
compatibility and de facto standards.
Before proceeding to the issues, it is worth noting that this particular
mindset with respect to software had its historical roots in the computer
hardware industry. Indeed, it is remarkable how the ideas advanced for
narrow software protection parallel longstanding popular ideas about
competition in hardware.
The origins of these notions can be traced to the commanding position
that ibm acquired, after an initially slow start, in the computer industry of
the late 1960s and the 1970s.23 At first ibm and other computer
manufacturers did not sell software; the buyer bought a mainframe and
Burrow-Giles, Justice Miller noted that the 1790 and 1802 statutes represented, in effect,
an interpretation of the Constitution by “members of the convention which framed it”
and speculated that photographs would have been included if only photography had
been discovered at that early date. 110 U.S. at 57-58.
21 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169 (1994) (“copyright’s very
purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”); Feist Publications v.
Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). (“The primary objective of
copyright is...[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”); and see Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029 (1994).
22 See also Ginsburg, supra note 9 at 993-994.
23 On ibm’s slow start, see Thomas J. Watson, Jr., 227-230 (1990).
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the software was “bundled” with it.24 But even after “unbundling” at the
end of the 1960s,25 a commercial fact of life was that sellers of hardware
peripherals, such as printers and storage devices, had to align themselves
on ibm’s own proprietary standards to be successful. For a variety of
reasons, it became conventional for peripherals to become ibm “plug
compatible”26 and for new application software to be written to run on
ibm machines and operating systems.27 Along with those developments
came the phenomenon of the “compatible” processor, which rather than
being intended to work with an ibm mainframe in the manner of a
peripheral device, was intended to substitute for an ibm mainframe.28
With the advent of the ibm personal computer, compatible computers
became known as clones, no doubt to emphasize their essential identity
with ibm machines.29
24

Franklin M. Fisher, James W. McKie and Richard B. Mancke, ibm and the U.S. Data
Processing Industry: An Economic History 23-25 (1983).
25 Id. at 176-179.
26 Derek F. Abell, Defining the Business 29-57 (1980). See California Computer
Products, Inc. v. Int’l Business Machines Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1979), where
the court pointed out that the plaintiff peripheral manufacturers’ policy was to “copy
and, where possible, improve upon an ibm design, and undersell ibm to its own
customers.” The plaintiff “was able to avoid ibm’s expenditures for research and
development and pass the savings on through lower prices” by “simply buying a device
from ibm, taking it apart, and building a similar one.” Ibid. But ibm asserted no
intellectual property rights in the products, and so the issue was whether ibm’s
competitive responses violated the antitrust laws. The California Computer and other
courts held for defendant ibm on the antitrust issues. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. Int’l
Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
27 Katherine Davis Fishman, The Computer Establishment 232-234 (1981).
28 Id. at 243-244. And see Lawrence A. Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy,
the ibm Cases, and the Transformation of the Law, 60 Texas L. Rev. 587, 599-601 (1982).
29 Charles Ferguson and Charles R. Morris, Computer Wars 51-53. As in the case
with mainframes, ibm was late to the personal computer market. Apple Computer, one
of the first, was able however to fend off clones. See G. Christian Hill, Apple Refocuses
Push to License Its Mac Program, Wall Street Journal B6 (July 18, 1994, characterizing
“Apple’s failure in the late 1980’s to license its Mac operating system [as] one of the great
strategic errors of modern business history.” For a variety of antitrust and business
reasons, ibm adopted what turned out to be an “open systems” approach to
microcomputers: “The specifications of ibm’s pc were easily obtainable, allowing
independent hardware companies to make compatible machines and independent
software vendors...to write applications that would run on different brands.” Harvard
Business School, Apple Computer 1992, p. 3 (Case 9-792-081) (1993). After a time Apple
became the principal personal computer manufacturer to pursue its own proprietary
standards, and most of the rest of the industry began to produce ibm clones. Ibid;
Ferguson and Morris, supra at 136-137. The word clone was originally used to refer to the
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The concept of the clone became so widely accepted that it seemed to
be an intrinsically inevitable aspect of the computer industry. And if clone
machines were in the nature of the industry, then why not clones of
operating systems? More generally, why not replicate application
programs, whether they be games,30 publishing programs,31 or
spreadsheets.32
The leap from replication of processors and operating system software
to replication of application software products of smaller computer
software firms can be seen in retrospect as a major transition for the
software industry. When ibm was the target, defenders of the practice
could refer to ibm’s strong market position, and especially its large
installed base, which made newcomers feel disadvantaged. The focus
from the beginning with application programs, however, was replication,
with comparatively little interest in attaching one application program to
another. The reason was that, in general, little money was to be made
attaching one application program to another. Rather, the financial payoff
came with replicating a product that had already achieved mass
popularity in the marketplace.
Before turning to the idea of replication of application programs, it is
important to examine a related phenomenon, which is the use in one
program of a particular convention that has proved useful in another
program for invoking a specific computer step. The importance of such
industry conventions in improving the ease of using a computer is most
easily seen in a set of developments originating with the Apple Macintosh
computer. The well-deserved reputation of Apple for ease of use stemmed
in large part from the early insight of Apple hardware and software
designers that users should be able to take the same action (pointing with
a mouse to the same icon or using the same keystroke) to engender the
same computer response no matter what software application they were
using.33 The widespread, even universal use of these conventions for
most inexpensive machines. Increasingly, however, manufacturers of higher end personal
computers also aligned themselves on ibm proprietary standards so that their machines
could use software written to those standards.
30 See, e.g., Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982).
31 See, e.g., Broderbund Software, Inc., v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F.Supp. 1127 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
32 See, e.g., Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F.Supp. 37 (D.
Mass. 1990).
33 For example, the same key or combination of keys is, in principle, used to perform
the same operation in every Macintosh-based application. This result is facilitated in part
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application programs for Apple computers contrasted with the experience
of many ibm and ibm clone pc users who found that the keystrokes for
each pc application program had to be learned one program at a time. The
result was that programmers began to use these Apple conventions even
for pc-based application programs.34
Adopting a particular convention originated by another for invoking a
particular response from a computer is quite a different thing from the
replication of an entire computer program. Such replication is a difficult
task. Difficult, that is, unless one simply copies a successful application
program. But outright copying was prohibited by the 1976 Act and the
1980 amendment affirming copyright protection for computer software.35
As a result follow-on competitors had two alternatives. One was to start
by copying the software of the innovator but then manipulating the
programming in such a way as to make detection of copying more
difficult.36
The alternative was to write a program independently but to try to
come up with a product that looked and felt to the user essentially the
same as the target program. The most important thing for follow-on firms
to copy if they were to take a ride on the popularity of a well-known
application program was the way the program looked to the human user
and the way the user interacted with the program. Since the typical user
cared little about the underlying programming (which was invisible to
him), it became popular to refer to this external aspect of an application
program as its user interface.37
by that portion of the Macintosh operating system known as the Macintosh Toolbox, with
which all program written for the Macintosh are forced to interact. “It’s said that once
you learn one Mac program, you know how to run any Mac program. This is no
coincidence: It’s built into the system.” John Rizzo and K. Daniel Clark, How Macs Work
25 (1993). See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006, 1019 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
34 One aspect of this cross-fertilization can be seen in the Apple-Microsoft litigation.
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1017-1022 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
35 See supra note 5.
36 See Miller, supra note 5 at 1027, and sources cited therein, with regard to
disguising traces of copying.
37 The concept of the user interface is not well-defined. However, a joint
pto/Copyright Office document states that the term is commonly limited to six elements:
commands, menus, questions and answers, form filling, icons, and function keys. U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office and U.S. Copyright Office, Patent-Copyright Laws Overlap
Study 44-45 (May 1991) (“Joint Overlap Study”).
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The copying of the user interface became the center of the controversy.
While most observers were prepared to agree that outright copying of the
underlying programming was infringement, some nevertheless defend the
copying of “interfaces,” meaning thereby the user interface. This line of
argument rests on a facile and misleading use of the term “interface” to
refer to two fundamentally different things. In normal circumstances
involving software copyright the word “interface” is used, for example, to
justify attachment of one software product to another software product.
But when speaking of the “user interface” the term is utilized to justify the
replacement of the latter. More specifically, the notion that copying
hardware and software interfaces for the purpose of promoting
attachment was not piracy but rather was efficiency-promoting through
facilitating interconnection thereby provided a verbal formula for
justifying outright copying of application software. If one could argue that
copying interfaces was defensible, why not the user interface?
Comparing the user interface to a hardware/hardware or a
software/hardware or a software/software interface was thus a
tendentious apples and oranges comparison. The user is not “attached” to
the application program in the manner that peripherals are attached to
hardware, or application programs to operating system programs, or even
one application program to another. Still, the term “user interface” caught
on because the user did interact with a program; the idea of a user
interface consequently became accepted. In the jargon-filled world of
computer-speak, software firms began to advertise their user interface.
When icons became popular, for example, firms vaunted their graphical
user interface (“gui”).
Powerful commercial motives for the follow-on companies to make the
user interfaces as close as possible to the innovator’s user interface became
conjoined with two phenomena that together generated sharply differing
views between the commercially successful first-generation application
software companies and their follow-on competitors. The first was that
independent replication, even of user interfaces, was difficult, costly, and
often not successful—at least without access to the target program code.
And the second was that the culture of the software community tended to
view existing software products much like academics view library
books—something to be acquired, studied in detail and then borrowed
from.38 The result of carrying this attitude too far was sometimes the
38

Cf. Pamela Samuelson and Robert J. Glushko, Comparing the Views of Lawyers
and User Interface Designers on the Software Copyright “Look and Feel” Lawsuits, 30
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software equivalent of academic plagiarism—that is, the copying of the
programming itself.
Against this background of commercial opportunity, difficulty of
replication, and a culture that built on and freely borrowed from the work
of predecessors, three separate notions developed that supported the
inclinations of the follow-on software firms: that software is not
sufficiently creative to deserve copyright protection, that the public would
be better off with greater choice among application software programs,
even if the programs were substantially identical, and that software is
simply so “different” that it requires its own form of protection. These
three notions crystallized in a few quite specific criticisms of the evolving
law insofar as it served to protect the first-generation innovating firms.
The first criticism is that since copyright protects only expression and
not ideas, the courts should adopt an approach that gives an expansive
interpretation to the concept of ideas and a narrow interpretation of
expression.39 The second criticism is that where software, whether
operating system or application, becomes so highly successful that it
becomes a “de facto standard” to which newer firms must adjust in order
to be commercially successful, then the constraints on actual copying
should be relaxed. The third criticism is that neither copyright nor patent
law is the appropriate basis for protection and that a sui generis form of
protection should be substituted.
With regard to the first criticism, the idea/expression dichotomy raises
few economic issues unless the courts shrink the area of protected
expression too far to permit the copyright law to deal adequately with the
fundamental problem that intellectual property is designed to solve—the
appropriability problem.40 Indeed, that is arguably what happened in at
Jurimetrics 121, 136-137 (1989): “When [software engineers] see good ideas and the
research that lies behind them, they feel they can incorporate these designs into new
products of their own. They do not consider themselves thieves, plagiarists, or copyright
infringers when they do so, but rather they consider themselves scientists and engineers
who are innovating on top of others’ ideas in the kind of evolutionary fashion which has
exemplified development in this fields.” For an illustration of this software industry
attitude, see Michael J. Miller, Software Patents Must Go, pc Magazine 79 (March 15,
1994).
39 A variant of this criticism emphasizes not so much the unprotectability of ideas but
the unprotectability under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) of “any...procedure, process, method of
operation, concept, principle or discovery.”
40 For a discussion of the appropriability problem, see infra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text. Economic problems may equally be raised if copyright is extended so
far that future innovation is stymied. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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least one recent case, in the service of dubious economic arguments.41
Alternatively, the idea/expression dichotomy could raise economic issues
if the area of protected expression were expanded too far into the area of
ideas, since the effect would be to discourage unduly future innovation.
The second and third criticisms, however, do raise economic issues. In
fact, the second criticism (which is variously referred to under the
headings of compatibility, de facto standards and network externalities)
explicitly relies on economic ideas. The third criticism, seeking to justify a
sui generis approach, is not primarily about economics but does raise one
significant economic issue.
These three central lines of copyright argument have been advanced
with great vigor, learning, and resourcefulness. But the issue, especially
with respect to the last two criticisms, is whether they represent sound
policy. That question can be answered at a number of levels. Here I do not
propose to spend much time on the legal conceptual level, which has been
analyzed at great length, usually from a traditional copyright point of
view. Although some brief reference to the doctrinal issues is necessary,
my focus will be on whether economics has anything useful to contribute
to the debate.
After dealing with the copyright issues, I shall examine the software
patent issues from an economic perspective. As we shall see, the economic
analysis of issues involving software-related patents is not a
fundamentally different inquiry from that involving copyright.
Nevertheless, the patent issues, coming from a different intellectual
property tradition, are necessarily different at the doctrinal level, as I shall
explain. Finally, I shall deal briefly with the relative merits of a sui generis
approach, again largely from an economic point of view.
III. A Survey of the Economics of Intellectual Property
As already emphasized, software is, among other things, a “useful
Art” with profound commercial and economic significance. Innovation is,
of course, the heart and soul of patent protection, but some people
apparently find it rather strange to think of copyright as protecting
innovation. Yet not only contu but the Congress as well determined that
copyright should be utilized to protect software innovations.42 It is
therefore not only warranted but, if one takes the legislation seriously,
41

See discussion of the Computer Associates case, infra at notes 74-85 and
accompanying text.
42 See discussion of new technology in contu 26.
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necessary to look to the economic aspects of intellectual property law
generally in determining how copyright principles should be applied in
carrying out that Congressional mandate.
Copyrights, like patents, are best thought of as property rights. The
property character of patents is explicit in patent law43 and only slightly
less so in copyright law.44
The fundamental justification for creating property rights in the results
of innovation is to deal with the appropriability problem.45 This problem
arises from the simple circumstance that in the absence of an intellectual
property right, the innovator would not be able to recoup his research and
developments costs in competition with those who, thanks to copying,
were able to sell the product without incurring those costs; therefore, the
rate of r&d would be less than it would be with an intellectual property
right and specifically, from an economic point view, that rate would be
less than optimal. This appropriability point, which refers to the inability
of the innovator to appropriate the benefits of his own r&d investments, is
obvious in the case of patents,46 but it is equally true in the case of
copyrights, even where the copyright covers works of such a purely
literary or artistic nature that the concept of r&d costs may seem farfetched. Using books as an example, Landes and Posner speak of the
expected “cost of expression,” which must be recoverable if new works
are to be created. In the absence of a property right, they point out, “The
market price of the book will eventually be bid down to the marginal cost
of copying, with the unfortunate result that the book probably will not be
43

35 U.S.C. § 261. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law, 23 J. Legal Stud. 247, 253 (1994) (hereafter Dam, Economic Underpinnings).
44 Copyrights are, as common legal parlance indicates, intellectual property. The
Copyright Act defines “ownership,” 17 U.S.C. § 201, and the fact that the ownership of a
copyright is separate from ownership of any particular copy underscores the intangible
property character of a copyright. Donald S. Chisum and Michael A. Jacobs,
Understanding Intellectual Property Law 4-184 n. 98 and 4-266. For a detailed analysis of
the property character of copyright, see Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenge of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan.
L. Rev. 1343, 1354-1394 (1989).
45 Dam, Economic Underpinnings 247.
46 See the explanation of the appropriability problem in the patent context, ibid. The
term “appropriability” can also be used to point out the ability, in the absence of an
intellectual property right to “appropriate” the benefits of the investment in innovation
of others—to reap where one has not sown.
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produced in the first place, because the author and publisher will not be
able to recover their costs of creating the work.”47
Although the notion of creating a property right to deal with the
problem of appropriability is, with limited exceptions,48 uncontroversial
with respect to such core subject matter as copyright in books, it is
sometimes argued that copyright protection is not necessary for software.
The fact is, of course, that Congress chose to cover software just as it did
the output of other technologies in the past such as engraving and
photography.49 In the face of that clear Congressional choice, those who
believe that protection is unnecessary to deal with the appropriability
problem with respect to computer software are reduced to essentially two
conclusions: that Congress was wrong and therefore the legislative choice
should be reversed or, alternatively, that the courts should construe the
legislative choice as narrowly as possible to eliminate copyright for
software in particular instances, say with respect to user interfaces. Before
returning to the user interface problem, it is useful to consider the first of
the foregoing two arguments, namely, the preliminary question whether
copyright is necessary at all for software.
If copyright is conceded to be necessary for the other subjects of
copyright, including those with a technological basis, then surely the
burden shifts to explain why there is no appropriability problem with
respect to software. One possibility lies in the frequently heard assertion
that being first to the market is a sufficient incentive for the writing of
software. Indeed, it is sometimes said that the first to market obtains such
an advantage that subsequent superior products have a special
disadvantage due to what are sometimes called “switching costs” (or the
equivalent, “lock-in costs”).50 Despite the undeniable existence of some
switching costs where a particular program becomes well-established in
the marketplace, one must remember that with modern technology the
cost of copying software is trivial—essentially the cost of the media—and
47

William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 328 (1989). See also William M. Landes, Copyright Protection
of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach, 21 J. of Legal
Stud. 79, 82-83 (1992).
48 See reservations in Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 291-308
(1970). But see Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1100 (1971).
49 See discussion supra at notes 4-92 and accompanying text.
50 See the discussion of switching costs infra at notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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that the time it takes to copy is far less than in the case of most other
subjects of copyright. In short, the advantages of being first to market, far
from being a substitute for copyright, are themselves a function of
copyright, because follow-on firms must themselves innovate under a
copyright regime, and first-to-market advantages would largely disappear
if copyright were eliminated for software. The first-to-market argument
against software copyright thus proves to be a chimera when one
approaches it more closely.51
Another line of argument against copyright is that many users will
choose not to copy but rather will acquire software in a legitimate market
transaction in order to have ready access to upgrades, manuals, help lines
and similar features of modern software marketing. This argument is
directed, however, to only one of the three common types of copying,
namely, the making by users of extra copies beyond those permitted by
contract or “shrink-wrap” license. Even assuming the merits of the
argument in that limited sphere, it has no merit in the context of the two
other types of copying that currently plague software innovators: piracy,
in which the copier sells a copy as an original and me-too copying, in which
copying is used to make me-too, follow-on products for sale under the
copier’s own trade name. Piracy is almost universally thought to be
worthy of legal condemnation, except perhaps in some developing nations
where some seek to justify it on poverty or development grounds and
where powerful interest groups have grown up to protect piracy of
software, tapes, records and movies.52
It is the third form of copying—in order to sell me-too products in
competition with a popular innovation—that has in fact given rise to the
most litigation and where, as we shall see, rather sophisticated arguments
have been advanced to justify the practice. These arguments, based on
compatibility, de facto standards and network externalities, will be
considered at length below. But even if one were to accept these
specialized arguments, they at best would lead to making exceptions to
copyright protection in quite limited situations, not to abolishing
copyright protection for software.
In considering the preliminary question whether copyright protection
should be available at all for software, it is worth bearing in mind that
51

A further and related question involves whether protection is needed for first-tomarket software programs that become industry standards. See discussion infra notes
125-155 and accompanying text.
52 Piracy normally involves passing off and therefore violates trademark law as well
as copyright.
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some arguments that have been advanced against the entire institution of
copyright actually have less force for software than, say, books.53 For
example, it is sometimes said that books would not disappear with the
abolition of copyright because authors have many motives ranging from
egotism to self-promotion to a quest for immortality and hence the need
for economic incentives to deal with the appropriability problem is not
such an important factor as one might suppose. Whatever the merits of
this argument for books, it has less merit in the modern software market
where much of the writing of software is a faceless, team effort without
such non-monetary incentives and, in any event, many modern software
products are so complex that they will only be undertaken by commercial
firms operating with commercial incentives.54
To say that a property right in software is necessary to deal with the
appropriability problem is not to say that no economic problems are
created by the use of copyright. But these economic concerns can be better
assessed once we accept that the appropriability problem must be solved
by some form of property rights if the necessary economic incentives are
to be created for software innovation. The three principal economic
concerns—monopoly, rent seeking and the possibility that innovation
today may be unduly favored over innovation tomorrow—warrant brief
treatment.55
The monopoly concern is overstated for two reasons. First, simple
observation tells us that even patents (which create a legal right to exclude
even in the case of independent creation) generate few monopolies in the
market sense; large r&d-oriented firms generate hundreds of patents a
year and yet few such firms have monopolies in any economic market.56 If
this is true of patents, it seems even clearer in the case of copyrights where
no power to exclude is granted, where only the power to preclude
copying is granted, and where independent creation by competitors is a
53

Landes and Posner, supra note 47 at 331.
Even authors of “shareware,” which is distributed free or for a minor
administrative charge, normally rely on copyright. See Anthony Lawrence Clapes,
Softwars 142 (1993). Nonetheless, shareware does exist and may be quite sophisticated,
and the writers of shareware do not normally try to enforce their rights.
55 The three concerns are analyzed at length in the patent context in Dam, Economic
Underpinnings. In the copyright context the terms used to refer to the need to avoid
unduly discouraging future innovation vary widely by author and subject, but include
“access,” “distribution,” “exploitation,” and even “competition.”
56 Id. at 249-250.
54
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complete defense.57 Second, according copyright protection does not
permit the innovator to restrict production, the hallmark of monopoly. At
most, the innovator will capture economic rent at the same level of output
as existed in the market before the innovation and, in the case of major
innovations leading to sharply reduced costs, output may actually
expand.58 In short, output will be the same or higher with the copyrighted
innovation than without the innovation. To be sure, if we assume, as does
most of the literature assumes at least implicitly, that the innovation
would have been made without the intellectual property right (or would
have been made by someone else very soon), then it may make more sense
to talk about monopoly and restriction of production. The question is
which perspective provides the most insight into the role of intellectual
property rights. As I have argued elsewhere, it makes more sense, and
better illuminates intellectual property law, to emphasize the rent seeking
rather than the monopoly problem.59
The fact that the grant of an intellectual property right may permit the
innovator to enjoy economic rent suggests that rent seeking may be a
problem. Economic rent is in one sense just a name that we give to the
incentive accorded the innovator by intellectual property protection, but
still public policy should attempt to minimize unnecessary rent seeking.
How important the rent seeking problem may be in the case of patents is
57

Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division investigated a
variety of public charges of monopoly and restraint of trade that had been made by
private parties against Microsoft. In the end Microsoft entered into a consent decree with
the Department of Justice. The consent decree was limited to Microsoft’s licensing
practices. In the most important provision Microsoft agreed not to charge royalties to pc
sellers on a per processor basis (which involved royalties even on machines loaded with a
Microsoft competitor’s operating system) but rather to charge only for each Microsoftinstalled operating system. See Microsoft Settles Accusations of Monopolistic Selling
Practices, 67 BNA Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. 106 (July 21, 1994).
58 See the explanation, using the example of patents, in Dam, Economic
Underpinnings 250-251, especially note 9. As pointed out there, the fact that output may
be lower than it would be if a patent were not granted and competitors could freely use
the innovation should not obscure the point that a patent does not lead to a restriction of
output below what it would have been in the absence of the innovation. Indeed, output
will expand if the innovation is a major one. See Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Parlor,
Modern Industrial Organization 666-679 (1989), including Figure 20.3(b) and
accompanying discussion.
59 See Dam, Economic Underpinnings. For example, patent law deals effectively with
the situation where the invention would have been made by someone else very soon
anyway. It does so through the nonobviousness requirement, which renders patent
protection unavailable for an invention that would have been obvious to someone skilled
in the art. Id. at 259 n. 53.
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an open question, though various patent doctrines reduce the extent of
any economic rent.60 In the case of copyrights, the fact that there is no
power to exclude independently created works suggests that rent seeking
is less of a problem than in the case of patents.61 Moreover, the copyright
doctrine of merger of expression and idea assures that there is no
copyright protection where there are no (or very few) alternative means of
expressing an idea and therefore underlying ideas and not just particular
software expression would be engrossed. This merger doctrine not only
tends to sharply reduce economic rent, but beyond that it also therefore
tends to reduce rent seeking. In the absence of the merger doctrine, firms
would especially seek to be the first to find the sole way of expressing a
software idea since they could thereby exclude follow-on firms from using
that idea, thereby carving out a zone of protection analogous to that
accorded by a patent to an original technological concept.
The third, and most important problem, concerning copyright
protection for software is the possibility that such protection will unduly
favor innovation today at the expense of innovation tomorrow. An
important function of an intellectual property regime should be to achieve
an appropriate stream of innovation over time.62 This is, of course, a
problem for copyright generally, not just for software copyrights. Landes
and Posner, proposing a concept of the “cost of expression,” show that
“beyond some level copyright protection may actually be
counterproductive by raising the cost of expression” since the “less
extensive copyright protection is, the more an author, composer, or other
creator can borrow from previous works without infringing copyright and
the lower, therefore, the costs of creating a new work.”63 As they point
out, “[F]rom an ex ante viewpoint, every author is both an earlier author
60

See generally Dam, Economic Underpinnings, 261-266.
Independent creation is an important exception for literal code but may be less
available where user interfaces are in question. In the case of popular mass-market
programs, for example, it is unlikely that any software engineer capable of writing such a
program would not previously have seen the screen displays or would be unfamiliar
with the other user interface elements. From a legal point of view, it is plausible to
assume access and therefore, if the original and competing user interfaces are
substantially similar, to infer copying. Moreover, the clean room concept for creating
competing software products (under which software engineers for follow-on firms work
in the isolation of a “clean room” with only general specifications from outside) may
work where literal code is involved but is therefore less likely to shield the results from
infringement liability in the case of non-literal elements such as user interfaces.
62 See Dam, Economic Underpinnings 253, 266-267.
63 Landes and Posner, supra note 47 at 332.
61
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from whom a later author might want to borrow material and the later
author himself.”64
This third economic issue is the central economic problem in the
software copyright field. Since it is an especially fast moving technological
field and since this new field is still fertile with innovations, the possibility
that the pace of progress could be slowed by copyright protection cannot
be ignored. Yet a failure to accord any protection would certainly slow
progress, and even more immediately, since it would discourage software
r&d expenditures. The objective of copyright law policy should therefore
be to achieve an appropriate balance of innovation over time.
IV. An Introduction to Software Copyright Doctrinal Issues
The prime copyright doctrine that achieves the balance between
innovation today and innovation tomorrow is the idea/expression
dichotomy. Ideas are freely appropriable and hence future innovators may
freely rely on ideas in others’ software to create new software.65 Only
expression is protected. But even expression is, as previously noted, freely
appropriable under the doctrine of merger if the underlying idea can be
expressed in only one or very few ways; in such a situation the expression
is said to merge with the idea.
Because of the importance of the idea/expression doctrine to the flow
of innovation in software, it should be no surprise that it has justifiably
become the main battlefield between first generation innovators and
follow-on firms in particular software fields. After briefly reviewing these
cases, I shall then confront the question whether additional concepts are
required, such as the concepts of compatibility, de facto standards and
network externalities.
Software copyright idea/expression cases may conveniently, though
somewhat artificially, be divided into three overlapping generations.66 In
the first generation—roughly the 1980s—the courts simply gave effect to
the 1976 Act and the 1980 amendment: software is protected even if it is
64

Id. at 333.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) provides: “In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery.” (Emphasis supplied) The term “idea” is not defined
and thus can be said to be a metaphor for what courts choose not to protect because the
costs of according protection, particularly the cost to future expression, are deemed not
worth the benefits in terms of the added incentive to present expression.
66 The classification of cases into three generations is one that seems most convenient
to the author; there are other classifications.
65
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utilitarian in character.67 The form of the software—whether object code,
source code or microcode—does not matter so long as it is “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression”68 and infringement can be established
without direct proof of actual copying so long as the defendant had access
to the copyrighted code and the plaintiff’s and defendant’s program are
substantially similar.69
The second generation of idea/expression cases dealt with the question
whether copyright protection extended beyond mere copying of the literal
code to so-called non-literal aspects of a computer program. The leading
case of Whelan Associates established the proposition that copyright
protection extends beyond “programs’ literal code to their structure,
sequence and organization.”70 Cases of this second generation, which have
sometimes mistakenly been referred to as “look and feel” cases,71 have
protected screen displays and other elements of the user interface without
insisting on a showing that the underlying literal code was identical or
even substantially similar so long as there are alternative forms of screen
displays or other user interface elements to express the underlying idea.72
This second generation has extended well into the 1990s. For example, in a
series of decisions finding infringement of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet
program, the screen display’s “menu structure, taken as a whole—
including the choice of command terms, the structure and order of those
terms, their presentation on the screen, and the long prompts” were
protected.73
The third generation began in the 1990s and overlaps in time the more
recent cases of the second generation. In fact, the second and third
generation precedents co-exist and are in different Federal judicial circuits;
thus, the Supreme Court may have to determine which generation of cases
67

See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.

1983).
68

17 U.S.C. § 102(a); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607
(7th Cir. 1982); E.F. Johnson v . Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn.
1985).
70 Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (1986).
71 The “look and feel” phrase is imprecise and therefore inappropriate. See the
comments of Judge Keeton in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740F. Supp.
37, 62-63 (D. Mass. 1990).
72 See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
73 Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass.
1990).
69
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survives. In these third generation cases, which also involve non-literal
program components, some courts have become worried that protection
was being too broadly accorded and have used a variety of subsidiary
copyright doctrines to sharply reduce the realm of protectable expression
and greatly expand the realm of unprotectable ideas in any program.
The leading case of this genre, the Second Circuit’s Computer Associates
decision, illustrates a methodology to accomplish this result.74 First, it
adopted a three-step procedure, involving “abstraction” and “filtration” of
the copyrighted program and then, and only then, “comparison” of the
two programs.75 The abstraction step, taken from a famous Learned Hand
dictum involving an alleged infringement of a play, “Abie’s Irish Rose,”
by a motion picture, “The Cohens and the Kellys,”76 emphasizes the need
to seek out unprotectable elements at a number of levels of abstraction in
the copyrighted program.
The filtration step involves the actual separation of unprotectable ideas
from protectable expression at each of these levels through three
successive techniques. The first applies the merger doctrine and broadens
it to include a situation where the copyrighted program has chosen the
most efficient manner of writing the code to accomplish a function; under
this technique expression merges with the idea when the expression
chosen is the most efficient, even though not the only way or perhaps not
even one of a limited number of ways of expressing an idea.77 The second
technique, by analogy to the scenes a faire doctrine,78 then excludes from
74

Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). Unlike
most of the software copyright cases, the challenged program was an operating system
program—a translator—rather than an application program. Moreover, it was designed
to run on a mainframe, unlike most recent cases, which have involved software for
personal computers.
75 The Computer Associates three-step approach was partly adopted in Gates Rubber
Co. v. Bando American Inc., 9 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 1993), although the Gates court
approved conducting the comparison step first, on the ground that copying of
unprotectable elements is probative on the key factual issue of copying of protectable
elements; only the latter, the court said, can give rise to liability. A much less elaborate
filtration approach had been adopted before Computer Associates in Brown Bag
Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992).
76 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1931).
77 982 F.2d at 707.
78 The scenes a faire doctrine, most easily understood in the fiction context, renders
unprotectable stock “incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter
indispensable” (such as, in fiction, a boy meets girl, boy loses girl plot) and thereby, in
the software context, treats stock or conventional means of expression as ideas. See Atari
v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
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infringement liability programmers’ choices “circumscribed by extrinsic
considerations.”79 The third technique is to exclude from the allegedly
infringed program material taken from the public domain.
The final of the three steps, after abstraction and filtration, is
comparison. The allegedly infringing program is compared with the now
sharply truncated copyrighted program, from which have been “sifted out
all elements...which are ‘ideas’ or are dictated by efficiency or external
factors, or taken from the public domain.”80
The Computer Associates case is particularly interesting for several
reasons. From a legal point of view, it betrays a fundamental underlying
disagreement with the Congressional decision mandate making copyright
a means of protecting software. The opinion by Judge Walker explicitly
states that the purpose of the three-step dissection is to assure that only a
remaining “core” or “golden nugget” of expression is protected.81 At the
same time he overlooks the well-established proposition that a work
composed entirely of unprotectable separate elements must nonetheless
be protected if those elements are combined in a sufficiently original
fashion.82 Even more telling, the opinion forthrightly characterizes judicial
copyright infringement analysis of computer programs as an “attempt to
fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole” and calls for “further
legislative investigation—perhaps a contu ii.”83
More interesting for present purposes than the legal methodology by
which Computer Associates sought to limit the availability of copyright
protection are the assumptions underlying that methodology. While
conceding that critics “have a point” in predicting that the methodology of
79

982 F.2d at 709. Among these extrinsic circumstances are “(1) the mechanical
specifications of the computer of which a particular program is intended to run; (2)
compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is designed to
operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4) demands of
the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the
computer industry.” 982 F.2d at 709-710.
80 982 F.2d at 710 (emphasis supplied).
81 982 F.2d at 710.
82 See discussion of this principle with illustrations, infra note 134. This principle is a
specific application of the more general principle, articulated by Judge Learned Hand,
that it is the sequence of unprotectable elements that constitutes protectable expression.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). Judge Walker
defended his views against criticisms similar to those in the text, arguably modifying his
position to come closer to the principle articulated in the text, in his comments at a
symposium. Copyright Protection: Has Look & Feel Crashed?, 11 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
L.J. 721, 726, 730 (1993).
83 982 F.2d at 712.
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his decision “will be a disincentive for future computer program research
and development,” Judge Walker opines that the purpose of copyright
law is not to confer a monopoly but rather to reward “artistic creativity.”84
Moreover, Judge Walker appears to misconceive the nature of innovation
and the property rights justification for its protection by equating
innovation with “hard work” and “significant labor and expense.”85
V. Compatibility, De Facto Standards and Network Externalities
The three generations of software copyright cases have been analyzed
without reference to a strong set of arguments that are to be found in the
secondary literature. In addition to seeking to expand the realm of ideas
and contract the realm of expression, academic critics have developed a
line of thought that emphasizes the importance of computer software
programs working together. The argument sails under a variety of flags.
One variant stresses the importance of compatibility, another the values
and dangers of standardization, a third, explicitly relying on the language
of economics, stresses network externalities. These three lines of attack are
at base one and the same argument.
1. Compatibility
In analyzing these three variants, a convenient point of departure is the
notion of compatibility because it is the one that is most familiar in the
computer industry. The idea of compatibility originally had more to do
with hardware than software and dates back at least to the period when
ibm emerged as the leading firm in the computer industry.86 The notion of
compatibility referred to a variety of specific industry issues. One had to
84

982 F.2d at 711. The virtually explicit assertion that copyright should only be
available for “artistic” works must come as a surprise to holders of copyrights on nonfiction books, maps and the like. As the Supreme Court said as recently as 1991, “[I]t is
beyond dispute that compilations of fact are within the subject-matter of copyright.” Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
85 Perhaps this passage in Judge Walker’s opinion should not be taken too seriously
since it is essentially a legal argument seeking precedential sustenance from the Supreme
Court’s decision the preceding year in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340 (1991), rejecting the “sweat of the brow” doctrine in holding that purely factual
compilations (there alphabetized telephone listings) were not copyrightable. Yet even
Feist specifically held that the creativity required for copyright has nothing to do with the
artistic creativity of which Judge Walker speaks and that even a “compilation of facts” is
eligible for copyright if it features “an original selection or arrangement of facts.” 499
U.S. at 350.
86 The history of compatibility and allied notions in the computer industry is briefly
summarized supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
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do with whether ibm should be required to take steps to ensure that
manufacturers of peripheral equipment would be able to attach their
equipment; they could do so only if that equipment was “compatible”
with an ibm mainframe. Indeed, the phrase to describe this relationship
between ibm mainframes and non-ibm peripherals became “plug
compatibility,” which meant essentially that a non-ibm peripheral could
simply be plugged into an ibm mainframe. This sense of compatibility
therefore stressed the ability to attach one machine to another where the
machines did different things but by working together could achieve
results not otherwise achievable. There was obviously a competitive
element in the sense that with plug compatibility non-ibm peripheral
manufacturers could compete with ibm peripheral products in sales to
users who already owned one or more ibm mainframes.87
Compatibility soon took on, however, a second meaning. Competing
mainframe manufacturers sought to make their mainframes compatible
with those of ibm. The objective here was not to attach but rather to
replace. In short, a compatible mainframe manufacturer could sell
mainframes in competition with ibm to buyers who, because they had a
large installed base of ibm mainframes, would not otherwise readily
consider buying a non-ibm mainframe.
With the advent of microcomputers (pcs), a related concept grew up:
the clone. The clone notion suggests an identity of product going beyond
mere compatibility, but the idea of a clone was in essence the same as that
of compatibility in the replacement sense. The clone could be sold to
replace an ibm product (or indeed the product of another clone
manufacturer).
We see then that from an early stage the concept of compatibility
encompassed two rather different concepts: (1) attachment, in the sense
that a compatible product of one kind—typically, a peripheral—could be
sold to attach to a different kind of product—typically, an ibm mainframe;
and (2) replacement, in the sense that a compatible product could be sold to
replace a product of a similar kind. Of course, replacement as a concept
need not mean literal replacement in the sense that the ibm mainframe
would be taken out of service; rather it could mean simply that an ibm
user could buy an additional mainframe from a second manufacturer
without incurring additional costs (beyond the price of the additional
mainframe) arising from the impact on the installed base of ibm
87

For an important case from this era involving plug compatible competition, see
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (1975).
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mainframes. Indeed, the concepts of attachment and replacement
converged linguistically as mainframes began to be networked in order to
achieve greater computing power. Then the competing mainframe
manufacturer could argue that his mainframe could “attach” to an ibm
mainframe in the same way that two ibm mainframes could be attached to
each other in a network.88
The distinction between attachment and replacement is essential to
making sense out of the various arguments advanced in favor of
compatibility in computer software. Some software attaches to other
software. For example, application software attaches to operating system
software. Similarly, some operating system programs attach to other
operating system programs—for example, data base programs are sold by
a number of firms in competition with one another and can be attached (if
they are compatible) to, say, an ibm core operating system.89 Again, one
application program can attach to another application program if they are
compatible.90 And of course operating system programs, if they are
written to be compatible with ibm mainframes, may be attachable not only
to ibm mainframes but also to competing mainframes that are ibmcompatible in the replacement sense. For example, in a number of
countries purchasers of mainframes from competing manufacturers
nevertheless bought or licensed ibm operating systems to run on those
“replacing” mainframes.
2. De Facto Standards
The term compatibility is closely related, in the arguments in favor of
narrow protection for computer software, to the idea of standardization.
Standardization in software initially emphasized the role of standards in
affecting the ability of followers to attach to the software of those who
came before. But as in the case of compatibility, it is essential for straight
thinking to distinguish standardization to facilitate attachment from
88

The phenomenon of the clone, whether mainframe or pc, also led to a convergence
between attachment and replacement in particular cases. A clone processor could be
viewed not only as a replacement but also as attaching to pre-existing peripherals. The
point is that attachment is a two-way street. Processors attach to peripherals and viceversa.
89 See the description of an ibm mainframe operating system in Innovation Data
Processing, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 585 F.2d 1470 (D.N.J. 1984).
Data base programs can be considered either operating system or application programs.
90 See, for an illustration, Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), involving entertainment
software attaching to other entertainment software.
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standardization to facilitate replacement. In addition, standardization is an
overly blunt term that can refer to a variety of kinds of standards. One
important, if ill-defined, distinction is that between de jure standards and
de facto standards. The concept of de facto standards will warrant
extensive analysis below because it has become the focus of an argument
for limiting copyright protection, namely, that copying of a program
should be permitted where it has become a de facto standard.
3. Network Externalities
Sometimes the ideas of compatibility and standardization are dressed
up in the language of economics by referring to network externalities.91
The notion is that where a network exists, social costs and benefits can
rather easily and obviously differ from private costs and benefits.
Computer software arguments thus draw sustenance from a well-known
and accepted set of ideas on network industries such as railroads and
telephones:
A node is a point in a network where two or more links intersect. A
link is a path between nodes. Any action of a firm that affects one link in
the network can affect the costs of all firms using links in the network.
One firm’s actions can create an externality that will not be accurately
reflected in a price system. That is, one firm’s actions can create costs that
it does not bear, but that other firms do.92
One can easily see that computers are frequently linked together in
networks in much the same manner as telephones. A computer may be a
node on a network just like a telephone may be and indeed copper wires
linking networked computers may be identical to the wires of a telephone
network. In such a context the economic idea of efficiency arising from a
network can be advanced to support rules that favor attachment—though
whether potential efficiencies are achievable in a particular case will
depend on the facts.93
91

See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1046, 1066-1071 (1989); Office of Technology
Assessment, Finding a Balance: Computer Software, Intellectual Property and the
Challenge of Technological Change 197-199 (1992).
92 Dennis W. Carlton and J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms,
with Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 446, 450 (1983).
93 A broader definition of network externalities would include positive consumption
externalities: “There are many products for which the utility that a user derives from
consumption of the good increases with the number of other users who are in the same
network.” Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424 (1985). While this broader definition might
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The problem with using the idea of network externalities in addressing
the intellectual property protection of software is that the supposed
externalities that are enumerated are usually not those having to do with a
network in the node and link sense. Where advocates are seeking to justify
replacement rather than attachment, the externalities are quite different. It
is said, for example, that if all sellers of a particular kind of computer
software—say, spreadsheet programs—adopted the same user interface,
then buyers could shift from one company’s product to another without
the need to retrain employees.94 This is indeed an externality—one that is
analyzed at length below—but adding the word “network” in front of
externality conveys little information. On the contrary, the arguments in
favor of copying for replacement of application software (which is what is
envisaged in the retraining argument) does not turn on whether the
computers are networked; it applies, or fails to apply, equally to standalone computers.
A. Switching costs and lock-in
Even though the network externalities rubric is a misnomer where
there is no network, it must be recognized that a firm with a highly
successful original software product may have an advantage over even an
innovating competitor where it is costly for users to switch. The question
is whether the existence of switching costs should affect the availability of
copyright protection.95 To analyze that question, we must recognize that
encompass operating systems, where the user is likely to enjoy access to more application
programs the more widely used the operating system is, it has much less relevance to
application programs. The benefits to me of your using the same word processing
program, for example, are much less important. For example, if I use Microsoft Word and
you use WordPerfect, I can not only send you a letter but also send you an electronic file
for you to edit, since I can save a Microsoft Word document as a WordPerfect file.
Indeed, if I use a Macintosh, I can also save my document onto a dos formatted diskette
so that you can edit it on your pc. In any case, this broader use of the adjective “network”
has the disadvantage that it converts a large portion of the universe of economic
decisions into “network” decisions, whether it is a case of buying a car, choosing a city to
live in or even seeing a movie, since in each case one’s utility may be affected by whether
too few or too many make the same decision.
94 See, e.g., Menell, supra note 91 at 1068.
95 The literature on switching costs appears more relevant than the literature on
network externalities simply because no network need be involved. But the switching
cost literature comes to no clear conclusions about the impact of switching costs on
competition. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of
Pioneering Brands, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 349 (1982); Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro,
Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs, 19 RAND J. of Econ. 123 (1988); Benjamin
Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak, 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev.
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switching costs are in no way special to software. Consider switching costs
in everyday life. It takes time and even money to change checking
accounts (going to the bank, buying new checks, etc.) Even more serious
are the switching costs in buying a new or a used car (the time spent
haggling with sales personnel, the sales tax that could be avoided by
staying with one’s old car, and so forth). Thus, switching costs are a
regular feature of most markets for specialized, differentiated products.
The principal switching costs involved with application software
involve training costs. Take the case of two application software products
where there is no attachment issue (for example, where there are two
independently derived application software products, both of which
attach to a given operating system). The simple fact that is that there are
likely to be training costs involved in buying a different application
software product than one is accustomed to. These may be easily
identified out-of-pocket costs, especially in the case of a firm changing
software products already widely used by employees. Or they may be
implicit costs generated by the temporary inefficiency attributable to
learning by doing.
In considering the application of the switching cost argument to
application software, it is important to note that the judicial decisions and
the economic literature treating switching costs as a problem warranting
special legal rules are concerned with the relationship between two
products, not the simpler one-product case of switching bank accounts,
automobiles or application software programs. In the judicial arena, for
example, the Supreme Court decision in the Kodak case concerned the
switching costs involved in Kodak’s practice of making it difficult for
users of Kodak copiers to switch from Kodak maintenance service to third
party service by refusing to sell Kodak parts to third party service firms.96
The copiers required ongoing service and at least some users wanted
original Kodak parts used; hence there were really three products in
Kodak: copiers, parts and service.
43, 49-63 (1993). Indeed, some of this literature suggests that switching costs can lead to
lower prices. See Paul Klemperer, Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs, 56 Rev. of
Econ. Stud. 405 (1989). In any case, this literature does not lead to the conclusion that the
existence of switching costs should lead to the abolition of property rights.
96 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). For a
thorough treatment of the switching costs aspect of the case, see Klein, supra note 95. The
legal issue involved whether there was an unlawful tie-in under the antitrust laws. No
such issue arises, of course, where there is only one product, as in application software
copyright infringement cases.
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Similarly, in the Data General case, Data General refused to sell its
operating system except in connect with Data General computers, thus
making it costly for users who had purchased software written for the
Data General operating system (and who therefore wanted to stay with
the Data General operating system) to switch to computers from so-called
“emulator” (clone) manufacturers.97 Two products were “tied ”:
computers and operating system programs.
The Data General case illustrates why the switching cost argument is
often referred to under the rubric of “lock-in.” The central idea is that a
user, having bought manufacturer A’s product X, which must be used
over time with product Y (which the user has bought or continues to buy
from A), will find it costly to switch to a new supplier of product Y if in
order to do so he must also, for technological or contract reasons, buy a
new product X from some manufacturer other than A. It is said the user is
locked-in by his prior purchase of product X from manufacturer A.98
The economic literature on switching costs seems to have been
stimulated by the development of the computer industry because, as in
Data General, the lock-in effect was thought to be an inevitable aspect of
the incompatibility between different hardware (and operating system)
standards. As we have seen, the industry evolved through the
development of clone machines to limit any such lock-in effect but even
today some manufacturers, notably Apple, have been able to resist clones
and to limit the choice of operating systems available for use on Apple
machines.
97

Digidine Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984). The Data
General case held the practice an unlawful tie-in, even though the market share of Data
General in both the tied and tying market was very small. See the District Court opinion,
In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1981). In this
respect the Data General precedent has not been followed by other circuits. See Will v.
Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1985); and Frank H.
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 Harv. J. of L. & Pub. Pol’y 113
(1990).
98 In speaking of Data General’s customers being “locked-in,” the Data General court
was not speaking of users but that was due to the peculiarities of Data General’s
distribution system, in which it sold computers and operating systems to third parties
who bundled them with compatible application software for resale to users. In Kodak the
Supreme Court stated, “If the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have
purchased the equipment, and are thus ‘locked-in,’ will tolerate some level of serviceprice increases before changing equipment brands. Under this scenario, a seller profitably
could maintain competitive prices in the aftermarket if the switching costs were high
relative to the increase in service prices, and the number of locked-in customers were
high relative to the number of new purchasers.” 112 S. Ct. at 2087.
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B. Two product versus one product cases
Whatever the correct analysis of these two product switching cost
problems, they are different from the one product case involving a user of
an application program who, so long as he switches to a different
application program written for the same operating system, does not have
to incur costs associated with the necessity of also buying a new second
associated product.
Any costs beyond the price of the new program are his own out-ofpocket costs—for example, retraining costs. As we have already seen, the
economy is full of similar situations: witness the bank account and new
automobile cases.
To be sure, there are some parallels between the one product and two
product cases. One of the worries in the literature is that in the two
product situation the seller of product A, having made the accompanying
sale of compatible product X, may be inclined to act opportunistically,
raising the price of product X because the user is now locked-in to X by
his prior purchase of product A.99 In the one product application program
situation the seller could conceivably act opportunistically with respect to
the price for upgrades or for additional copies of the program itself. But
the ability to act opportunistically in this way is limited by the extent of
the out-of-pocket costs involved in switching since there is no need to
purchase a second new product in order to switch. Moreover, the user in
the one-product case is well aware at the time of the initial purchase that
he is locking himself in to this limited extent and that knowledge is itself a
factor in the price that can be charged at the time of the initial purchase.100
Indeed, in the world of firms acquiring many copies of an application
program (which is the world envisaged in the training cost argument), the
99

This was the Supreme Court’s worry in the Kodak case. See supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text. For a review of the economic literature, see Michael L. Katz and Carl
Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. of Econ. Persp. 93 (1994). This
approach to tie-in sales ignores a standard economic explanation for tying products
consumed over time to long-lasting products with which they are used, namely, price
discrimination. See discussion and literature citations in Kenneth W. Dam, Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel: “Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be,” 1969 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1, 15-17.
100 This limited one-product opportunity for opportunistic behavior is present in all
service industries. For example, one could as easily be worried about the opportunistic
behavior of banks, who might impose higher bank charges once an account had been
opened, of lawyers who might raise their hourly rate once work on a case began, and so
forth.
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seller’s ability to act opportunistically is limited whenever a new sale is
made.
C. Switching costs and incentives
The question with respect to switching costs in the application
software context is, at base, not whether such costs exist but whether they
are significant and, specifically, whether they outweigh the impact on
incentives for innovators that would be involved in carving out an
exception to copyright protection, especially an exception for what may be
called “me-too copying”—that is, wholesale copying by a competitor who
seeks to sell a competing, but substantially similar, product under his own
trademark.101 Most critics of software copyright would restrict such
copying to the situation where the targeted program constituted a de facto
standard. This makes sense from the standpoint of the new competitor
who will find it hard to attract new customers to the extent that existing
users of a de facto standard program would have to incur substantial
training costs and to that extent be less likely to want to switch to the new
product. On the other hand, the extent of training costs can vary greatly
with the nature of the targeted program, being as easily high for programs
with low market share and low for programs with high market share as
vice-versa. To be sure, a competitor would be unlikely to want to copy a
program with a low market share. Nonetheless, it is not possible to equate
de facto standards and high training costs, and therefore the case for
permitting copying of de facto standards products would have to turn on
a factual inquiry in each case as to the competitive significance of training
costs—an inquiry, lawyers might stress, for which a court would have no
clear standard to apply.
One line of argument for permitting copying of any de facto standard,
regardless of the extent of training costs, might be that software products
rarely achieve de facto standard status. Indeed, according to this
argument, that level of success occurs so rarely that, at the r&d stage, an
application software firm would be unlikely to base its investment
decision on the possibility that such a rare outcome would occur.102 Such
an argument would be based on a misconception. The r&d decision would
depend on the expected return, which conceptually depends on the
probability of each outcome times the profit associated with it. Though
101

The me-too case is addressed at length, and distinguished from the case of a
competitor who seeks to create an improved version while copying the copyrighted
version as a base or kernel, infra notes 139-155 and accompanying text.
102 Cf. Landes and Posner, supra note 47 at 352.
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many software ventures have failed and mediocre results abound, major
successes in application software, though infrequent, have led to large
payoffs. For example, Lotus Development Corp. has become the third
largest U.S. independent software company with a billion dollars per year
in revenues largely on the basis of its 1-2-3 spreadsheet product; even
today the latest version of that program remains its major product.103
The analogy to the importance of “giant fields” in the incentives for
petroleum exploration is suggestive. In both industries there are literally
thousands of firms motivated in part by the possibility, admittedly small,
of a very large payoff. This motivation is rational; it simply reflects the
principle that what counts in making an investment is the expected return,
not the most likely return. A rule permitting copying of a product when it
reaches de facto standard status must therefore have an effect on
incentives. To return to the oil field analogy, a rule providing for the
uncompensated confiscation of outsize discoveries would obviously have
an
impact
on
explo103

Value Line Investment Survey 2118 (March 11, 1994). The very financial success of
Lotus Development raises the question whether intellectual property protection can
overcompensate. Acknowledging the argument about expected return made in the text,
an issue is whether Lotus, for example, was overcompensated for the innovation in Lotus
1-2-3. One line of such criticism is that the Lotus menu tree was actually a minor
innovation, analogous to the “H” automobile gearshift innovation referred to in
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex.
1978), especially because Lotus was not the first firm to sell an electronic spreadsheet but
rather built on the efforts of Visi-Calc (even though, as Judge Keeton found in the Lotus
case, the crucial expression in Lotus 1-2-3was quite different from that in Visi-Calc. Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 67) (D. Mass. 1970)). A second
line of criticism, in contrast, would assume the importance of the Lotus innovation but
nonetheless, viewing intellectual property as a monopoly, raise the question whether
intellectual property protection is justified where it results in returns greatly exceeding
the cost of innovation, a result that would in principle not be possible under competition.
This second line of criticism, using the competition versus monopoly paradigm, would
also argue that what counts in determining scope of protection is its cost and would lead
to the conclusion that, as under competition, return should be related to cost. This issue
arises with respect to all intellectual property rights in all industries. We do not seek, for
example, to void patents simply because the return to the patentee seems excessive
compared to his r&d costs. Quite the contrary, courts in some eras have positively
favored essentially costless inventions under such rubrics as “flash of genius.” In
considering the overcompensation issue, the question should be whether copyright
overcompensates software copyright owners as a class.
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ration activity.104
In short, not only is the importance of switching costs a factual
question in each case to which no a priori answer can be given, but it is
also true that the denial of copyright protection whenever a software
product achieves major marketplace success is bound to have an effect on
the incentives for software r&d. Moreover, one result of such a rule, which
would probably require litigation to determine its applicability in
individual cases, would be to make intellectual property rights even more
uncertain and poorly defined than they inevitably must be. Nonetheless,
the idea of switching costs is a more precise and conceptually useful
analytic construct for discussing the issues raised in the literature than are
the concepts of compatibility, de facto standards and network externalities
themselves. The reason is that the switching cost concept permits us to
focus on the size of those switching costs rather than talking in conceptual
generalities.
Finally, we can conclude that these three broader ideas (compatibility,
de facto standards and network externalities) turn out to be not only
closely related but essentially the same when used to condemn copyright
protection. In all three cases the argument boils down to the proposition
that the economy would be better off if follow-on firms could simply copy
first-generation innovators’ software products where it would be costly
for existing users to switch to a new product. All that differs is the verbal
justification and in fact all three arguments apply to roughly the same
situation—where the first-generation firm has a leading position in the
particular software market and a follow-on competitor seeks to market a
replacement product. Compatibility is normally sought only with an
industry leader’s product; only a leader in a particular class of products
can be thought to have created a de facto standard; and retraining
“externalities” are quantitatively, in aggregate at least, most significant
where the first-generation product is a market leader.105
104

The discussion in the text abstracts from the question whether software firms or
oil exploration firms are risk averse and whether they are able to diversify their risks. For
a discussion in the context of oil exploration and the auction system of allocating
exploration licenses, see Kenneth W. Dam, Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? 160-169
(1976). Denying copyright protection for highly successful software products would be
analogous to the common governmental practice of changing tax and royalty rules after
large oil fields are found, a practice that feeds back into the initial investment decisions of
oil exploration companies. See id. at 173-179
105 The text is concerned with the possibility of making an exception to copyright
protection in the case where the first-generation firm’s product becomes so successful
that it can be called a de facto standard. The issue of copying of standards can arise in
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VI. Contractual Solutions
Before pursuing in greater detail the case for and against copying to
achieve replacement, we should examine more closely the use of contract
to solve many of the problems that critics have perceived to be created by
use of copyright protection. These contractual solutions are easiest to see
in the attachment situation, and therefore they will be explored in that
context before proceeding to consider their use in the replacement
situation. We may accept the argument that in many cases there are gains
to society from facilitating attachment of computer software programs,
whether we think of them as gains from compatibility or standardization
or from overcoming externalities. What is frequently overlooked is that
first-generation firms have incentives to capture these gains. Let us take
the case of an innovating firm that is first with a new kind of hardware or
software product. The innovating firm may believe that it can gain from
allowing, indeed encouraging, other firms to attach to its new product. If
so, it has a variety of means to achieve that goal. Some are unilateral,
others multilateral. Among the unilateral means are simply the
communication of the necessary information to those who write
complementary software for attachment. The form of the communication
may be publication through manuals or written documents containing the
requisite interface information.106 But it may also take other forms, from
working directly though informally with other software firms to more
explicitly contractual forms such as licensing, joint ventures, and strategic
alliances.107 In short, firms may pursue standardization through contract.
other contexts. For example, an original innovator may simply fail to be successful, yet
some aspects of his programs may be found in later products. These follow-on elements
will usually be industry conventions that are unprotectable. See discussion infra, note
131-134 and accompanying text. This possibility is not fanciful. It is common knowledge
that elements of the Microsoft user interface were created by Xerox and that Lotus 1-2-3
adopted elements of an earlier Visi-Calc program. Neither the Xerox nor the Visi-Calc
programs survived commercially, though Lotus did buy Visi-Calc’s rights. Clapes, supra
note 54 at 42. These kinds of standards issues are not examined because the thrust of the
inquiry here is to examine the economic arguments advanced to justify copying of
successful programs.
106 See, e.g., the discussion of ibm’s Common User Access SAA Manual in Nimmer
on Copyright §13.03[F][3] (1993).
107 In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 717 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (N.D. Cal.
1989), the court observed, “Both Apple and Microsoft rely heavily on third-party
programmers to develop application programs to run under their respective operating
environments, thus enhancing the value of operating environments.”
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Indeed, if we use the language of externalities we may say that the firm
can contract to overcome the externality.108
In many, probably in most, situations the original innovator has found
it in its interest to try to enhance the number and quality of attaching
products rather than trying to keep the market for attaching products to
itself. Thus, computer manufacturers actively seek to increase the number
of software firms writing programs for their particular hardware platform
because they recognize that their success in doing so is likely to determine
the market success of that platform. Similarly, firms selling operating
systems usually try to increase the number and quality of application
programs to run on their operating system.109
Firms may choose, however, to proceed in an overtly more multilateral
way. Such approaches are commonly referred to as standardization. For
example, firms in a particular industry may get together to create
standards so that software programs may attach and work together in the
same way that plugs and sockets permit machinery to work together.
Sometimes these multilateral efforts are informal and ad hoc but often
firms proceed under the auspices of a formal standard setting
organization.110 These multilateral efforts also involve at base the
institution of contract and, to the extent one thinks of attachment as
facilitating networking, they involve using contract to overcome network
externalities.111
108

This use of these various forms of contracting to deal with externalities is, of
course, the essence of the Coase Theorem. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. and Econ. 1 (1960). It is worth noting that in the computer software arena, the
costs of transacting are relatively low because despite the total number of firms in the
industry, the number involved in any particular software product area is much smaller.
109 Katz and Shapiro discuss some of the alternatives under the rubric of “strategies
to attract users to networks.” See supra note 99 at 103-105. The text focuses, for ease of
illustration, on contractual initiatives taken, in the attachment situation, by an original
innovating firm, say an operating system company. Alternatively, a follow-on firm with a
new product—say an application program—may take the contractual initiative, seeking
out the former firm in order to assure attachability.
110 This kind of multilateral standard setting is described in Office of Technology
Assessment, Global Standards: Building Blocks for the Future (1992), and much of the
relevant literature is cited therein. See also National Research Council, Intellectual
Property Issues in Software 70-71 (1991).
111 One can, of course, postulate conditions under which the innovator might have
incentives not to provide the requisite interface information to encourage other software
firms to attach. Or an innovator might have incentives to try to prevent standards from
being adopted that would facilitate attachment. One could postulate, for example, that
the innovating firm might want to provide the attaching software program itself and
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Although the use of contract as a solution to externality problems is
most visible in the attachment world, it can equally well be used in the
replacement world. Competitors can achieve gains by standardizing their
products in order to create a larger market for their class of software or in
order to share resources. Perhaps the most publicized recent example was
the alliance between Apple and ibm to create a new operating system to
compete with Microsoft.112 The same kinds of initiatives are possible in the
application software arena. We shall return to this theme in considering
the improvement case, where one firm seeks to improve the application
program of another but needs to copy the latter’s product in order to be
able to sell his new program successfully. All that is required is that there
is a gain to be enjoyed, in which case the parties will have an incentive to
share it through contract, provided that the follow-on firm is not enable to
copy outright through an exception to the copyright law.113
VII. Competition among Standards
Before pursuing further the me-too and improvement cases, it is
important to consider an alternative to permitting copying that is seldom
discussed in the literature. That alternative is to encourage competition
among standards by prohibiting copying even in de facto standard
situations. Much of the economic literature assumes that competition
among operating system programs or among application programs will
not exist for long. This literature holds that such markets involving rival
standards are “tippy” and therefore that one standard or the other is likely
to triumph.114 In other words, the reigning hypothesis concerning tipping
is that the competition we observe in pc operating systems programs and
in word processing and spreadsheet programs should not exist or at least
is unlikely endure.
therefore might attempt to protect its market for the attaching product by withholding
the information necessary for follow-on competitors to provide an attaching product. Or
one might postulate that the innovating firm, believing that it had a superior market position, say through intellectual property protection or lower costs for its core product,
might seek to “bundle” its core product with an attaching product so that the buyer who
wanted the core product would be induced to acquire the attaching product from the
innovator, not from a follow-on firm. These issues, which have formed the basis of public
allegations against some leading firms, are beyond the scope of this article.
112 See i.b.m. Now Apple’s Main Ally, N. Y. Times D1 (Oct. 3, 1991).
113 See discussion of the improvement case, infra notes 139-152 and accompanying
text.
114 See review of the economic literature in Katz and Shapiro, supra note 99 at 105106.
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Liebowitz and Margolis have pointed out that the tipping hypothesis,
especially the notion that earlier inferior products are likely to exclude
later superior products, is based largely on two historical incidents,
vhs/Beta and qwerty/Dvorak, both of which have been badly
misunderstood.115 More recent work emphasizes that competition among
standards does exist and that, in any case, there is no general principle
that dictates that superior products will not displace earlier inferior
products.116
If one looks to the software world today, competition among standards
appears to be common, to persist and to lead to remarkable progress.
Three illustrations from the pc world—operating systems, spreadsheets,
and data base programs—reveal a common pattern. In operating systems
Microsoft clearly has the lead with its ms-dos and its overlay, Windows,
but it faces strong competition from a number of other operating systems.
This competition continues even though Microsoft’s ms-dos was first to
the pc market. As Markoff observes:
Microsoft supplies the most popular operating system, ms-dos,
controlling more than 80 percent of the pc operating system market.
However, a number of competing programs are available, including
System 7 from Apple Computer, Inc. for Macintosh computers, dr-dos
from Novell Inc. and os/2 from [ibm].117
A broader definition of the market shows Microsoft accounting for
only 66 percent of the operating system market in 1993.118
In spreadsheets the first successful “standard’ was Visi-Calc, which
was not only first to market but popularized the concept of the electronic
spreadsheet. Yet it was displaced by Lotus 1-2-3, and today there are at
least four major competitors: “Lotus’s 1-2-3 and Microsoft’s Excel are
battling for lead position [while] Borland’s Quattro Pro, and CASuperCalc, from Computer Associates, are also strong contenders.”119 In
115

S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, 8 J. of Econ. Persp. 133 (1994).
116 Katz and Shapiro, supra note 99 at 108. On the value of product design
competition in software, see Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30
Jurimetrics 35, 48-49 (1989).
117 John Markoff, Justice Department Considers Inquiry on Microsoft, New York
Times 16 (Aug. 1, 1993). See Clapes supra note 54 at 23 (1993). dr-dos is now known as
Novell dos. Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft’s Operating System Rivals Get a Boost, Sort
Of, New York Times, Sunday Business Section 7 (July 24, 1994).
118 See graphic in John Markoff, Microsoft’s Future Barely Limited, New York Times
D1 (July 18, 1994).
119 Mike Lewis, What’s Between the Sheets?, Computer Weekly (Feb. 10, 1994).
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1993 Lotus Development, far from having the de facto standard, trailed
Microsoft 37.0 percent to 52.7 percent.120 A similar story can be found in
the data base field. Ashton-Tate was once the frontrunner, but when it
failed to navigate successfully the transition from an Apple to a pc
environment and to deliver upgrades on time, it quickly lost market
position and was eventually acquired by another firm.121 More recently its
dBase product has faced strong competition from a variety of products
with many new features and structures.122
The result of this competition among standards thus appears to be, if
anything, an increase in the number of competing software products
rather than the coalescence into one de facto standard product in each
category that is assumed in some of the literature. In fact, with the rapid
increase in power of microcomputers, they are increasingly coming into
competition with so-called workstations which use a Unix-based
operating system, and therefore a series of additional Unix-based
application programs provide competition for more traditional
microcomputer application programs.
The data on competiting standards call sharply into question the
meaning of the familiar concept of a de facto standard. On the one hand,
can a program be a de facto standard when it faces strong competition
from competing standards? If so, can there be more than one de facto
standard in a particular product category? If so, how many? If Apple’s
System 7 is number four in microcomputer operating system field, can it
nevertheless be considered a de facto standard? If the answer is
affirmative, on the ground that it is the dominant system for use on Apple
microcomputers, can we consider Novell and ibm’s operating systems,
which trail Microsoft badly, also de facto standards? If we consider the
relative losers in the competition among standards to be de facto
standards, and therefore to be subject to copying by competitors, what are
the implications for competition, not to speak of incentives for innovation?
Not only do standards thus compete and do those first to the market
not always maintain their preeminence, but even more to the point from
the standpoint of the user is the fact that the frontrunners at any one time
can stay ahead only by continually upgrading their product. Microsoft
120

See graphic in Markoff, supra note 118.
Clapes, supra note 54 at 23.
122 John L. Hawkins, The dBASE Report, Data Base Advisor (July 1990). Word
processing programs show similar competition among standards. In 1993 Microsoft had
47.6 percent of the market and WordPerfect 35.7 percent. See graphic in Markoff, supra
note 118.
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may have been first to the pc marketplace through its initial contract with
ibm but it stayed ahead of its rivals, including ibm itself with its os/2, by a
number of major upgrades of its ms-dos and then by introducing an
attractive new product, Windows, which though built on top of ms-dos,
looks fundamentally different from ms-dos to the user and is one of the
best selling software products in history. Today Microsoft is rapidly
introducing a series of extensions and upgrades in order to be able to
maintain its lead; for example, in a much publicized upgrade code-named
Chicago, Microsoft will, according to its announcements, emancipate its
operating system from its ms-dos platform.123 In this light one can fairly
ask whether, for example, consumers would have been better off if the
original Microsoft dos program had been freely copiable on the ground
that it had become a de facto standard and therefore it was important to
save on training costs. No doubt in such an environment ms-dos would
have survived and Microsoft would still have been forced to innovate to a
certain extent in order to stay abreast of increases in computer power, but
it is hard to conclude that users would have been better off if ms-dos had
been, in effect, expropriated, all in the name of compatibility, de facto
standards or network externalities. What would have been lost was user
interface competition that has created not only alternatives to the
Microsoft standard but also more competitive pressure on Microsoft itself
to innovate. Thus, competition among standards, with the resulting
impetus for rapid improvements in leading products, is arguably much
more important for users than any reduction in prices that might result
from allowing copying of those leading products.124
123

See Christine Burns, Microsoft Making Travel Plans for its Operating Systems:
Vendor Stopping in Daytona, Chicago and Cairo, Network World (Dec. 17, 1993/Jan. 3,
1994); Ed Bott, Inside Windows 4.0; Microsoft Corp.’s Chicago Operating System, 7 pc
Computing 124 (March 1994).
124 User interface competition in application software has another important
advantage that is often overlooked in the literature. Such competition has largely avoided
the problem, so often discussed, of premature coalescence around de facto standards—
otherwise sometimes referred to as the qwerty keyboard problem. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell
and Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product
Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 940 (1986). Postulating that more
efficient keyboards than the familiar qwerty keyboard exist, Farrell and Saloner explain
that premature convergence on the qwerty keyboard created “excess inertia” making
transition to a better standard infeasible. Liebowitz and Margolis have argued with
copious evidence that the oft-repeated story of the inferiority of the qwerty keyboard
relative to the later Dvorak keyboard is a myth. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis,
The Fable of the Keys, 33 J. of L. & Econ. 1 (1990).
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VIII. The Me-too, Follow-on Product Case
The fact that standards competition not only exists and that later
superior products not only succeed but sometimes displace earlier “de
facto standards” is especially important in the contemporary litigation
context because the striking fact about the software copyright cases is not
just that nearly all involve replacement rather than attachment. They often
also involve a struggle between one firm that, as innovator, was first to a
new market with a popular software program and a second firm that,
coming along later, sought to sell a competing product that was as close as
possible, from the buyer’s perspective, to the original innovating
product.125 This me-too copying is to be distinguished from the case, less
common in the judicial decisions, of a struggle between an initial
innovator and a follow-on innovator who tries to compete by putting a
new and better product based on the original product into the same
marketplace. This latter case we may call the substantial improvement
case.126 Indeed, it is because the bulk of the cases involve a me-too product
that they usually deal with the user interface, especially screen displays.
For these reasons, the economic arguments that are used in attacking
copyright protection warrant being tested in the replacement context and,
specifically, the me-too case.127
125

See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1244 (3d
Cir. 1983); Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 12281229 (3d Cir. 1986); Computer Associates Int, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698-700, 718719 (2d Cir. 1992). For example, in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F.
Supp. 37, 69-70 (D. Mass. 1990), the follow-on firm not only copied but was able therefore
to “truthfully declare” in its VP-Planner manual:
VP-Planner is designed to work like Lotus 1-2-3, keystroke for keystroke....VPPlanner’s worksheet is a feature-for-feature workalike for 1-2-3. It does macros. It
has the same common tree. It allows the same kind of calculations, the same kind of
numerical information. Everything 1-2-3 does, VP-Planner does.
Although there were differences between the Lotus and Paperback user interfaces, Judge Keeton was much more impressed with the similarities: “From the
perspective of both an expert and an ordinary viewer, the similarities overwhelm
differences.” 740 F. Supp. at 70.
126 The substantial improvement case is discussed infra notes 139-152 and
accompanying text.
127 The de facto standard argument for an exception to copyright protection applies
primarily to replacement rather than attachment. The question of the protection of
interfaces in the attachment context raises a more complicated set of questions. In any
event, the interfaces involved in that context are usually not user interfaces but rather
internal interfaces.
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In the me-too case, the argument for permitting copying is essentially a
conventional competition argument rather than an intellectual property
argument. Permitting me-too copying is not necessary to permit future
innovation because, by definition, the me-too copier does not seek to
innovate.128 Moreover, permitting me-too copying restricts the incentives
for the first generation firm to innovate. For these reasons, some courts
have recognized the inconsistency between the de facto standard
argument and intellectual property principles and the irony that would be
involved in protecting minor innovations, while denying protection to
major innovations that gain wide consumer acceptance, by rejecting any
“commercial necessity” argument for copying.129 Although some analysts
would prefer to incorporate conventional competition arguments in the
interpretation of intellectual property laws, the result might well be to
undermine the coherence of both fields of law since the antitrust laws
remain available to attack true market monopolies and restraints of trade
in software markets. Indeed, the de facto standard argument has been
advanced primarily to support me-too copying where market power in
the antitrust sense did not exist. Thus, to deny protection on competitive
grounds is to introduce a kind of mini-antitrust law for intellectual
property cases that we would be unwilling to apply in other areas of
law.130
128

In the improvement case, the de facto standard argument has more relevance. See
infra notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
129 This was a key point for Judge Keeton in the Lotus litigation: “By arguing that 12-3 was so innovative that it occupied the field and set a de facto standard, and that,
therefore, defendants were free to copy plaintiff’s expression, defendants have flipped
copyright on its head. Copyright protection would be perverse if it only protected
mundane increments while leaving unprotected as part of the public domain those
advancements that are more strikingly innovative.” Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int’l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 79 (D. Mass. 1990). See also Allen-Myland v. International
Business Machines Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1990): “Otherwise, a computer
program so complex that vast expenditures of time and money would be required to
develop a different program expressing the same idea would not be protected, even if
innumerable different programs expressing that idea could be written, while a simpler
program requiring less significant expenditures of time and money might be protected.”
See also Consul Tec, Inc. v. Interface Systems, Inc., 3 CCH Computer Cases ¶ 46,685 (E.D.
Mich. 1991).
130 The competition argument for a de facto standards exception assumes that the
follow-on firm is at an unnatural disadvantage if prevented from copying. It is often
overlooked that even a follow-on firm that elects not to copy nonetheless has cost
advantages over the original innovating firm. For example, the follow-on firm is able to
determine from the success and failure of earlier innovators what works and what does
not and what appeals to users and what does not. Hence, even without copying, the
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In considering the de facto standard argument in favor of copying to
facilitate me-too products, it is a sign of the weakness of the argument that
it is often interwoven with a number of software-specific arguments. For
example, it is asserted that copyright owners should not be permitted to
protect aspects of their programs that are so popular that they have
become part of the common repertory or tool kit of software writers. The
short answer is that software copyright doctrine already denies protection
for unoriginal aspects of an otherwise original target program. In doing
so, copyright law simply applies well-established principle from nonsoftware cases that limit protection to original expression. For example, a
target program receives no protection for aspects of that program that are
in the public domain131 or that were copied from predecessor programs.132
Similarly, one cannot copyright an industry convention,133 just as one
cannot copyright a word in the English language or a popular
expression.134 To that extent the de facto standard argument adds nothing
follow-on firm benefits from the efforts of those who went before. Cf. Easterbrook, supra
note 99at 115. Moreover, the notion that copyright primarily protects large firms against
smaller rivals is, at best, an exaggeration. For example, Lotus, founded in 1982, was small
when it first launched Lotus 1-2-3, perhaps smaller than Software Arts, the owner of VisiCalc. See description in Clapes, supra note 54 at 42. Moreover, even de facto standards do
not always belong to large firms. An illustration from the field of software-related
patents involves Stac’s compression technology, which was almost certainly a de facto
standard but, according to the jury, was improperly used by Microsoft. See infra note
174.
131 Computer Associates Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992).
132 Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 779 F. Supp. 133, 134-135 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
133 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1023-1024 (N.D.
Cal. 1992), refusing protection where features are incorporated in most graphical user
interfaces. Principles permitting copying of conventional terms, definitions and
structures are not peculiar to software but rather apply equally to written works. See
Business Trends Analysts v. Freedonia Group, 650 F. Supp. 1452, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
McGraw Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(copyright does not protect economic terminology in an economics textbook): “The long
history of the development of the discipline has resulted in a large corpus of technical
words and phrases whose meaning have been fixed, and of concepts whose importance is
generally acknowledged. No professor dealing in the basics could hope to be successful
with a radical departure from either the jargon or the substantive professional consensus,
on issues where one exists.” In all of these examples, the conventions in question are, in
effect, in the public domain.
134 The fact that individual words in the English language cannot be copyrighted
does not mean that a passage composed of those words cannot be copyrighted; Nimmer
gives the illustration of Hamlet’s soliloquy, where a Shakespeare writing today could not
protect “to,” “be,” “or,” and the like but could surely protect the soliloquy. Nimmer on
Copyright § 13.03[F] n. 345.1 (1993). An original compilation is copyrightable, even
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to existing copyright doctrine. To be useful, the de facto standard
argument must apply to the original aspects of the target program.
Perhaps precisely because the de facto standard argument is weak in
the me-too replacement context, the notion of network externalities has
been piled on top of that argument in order to bolster it, even though, as
previously discussed, the de facto standard and network externalities
arguments are at base one and the same.135 Nevertheless, assuming that
major externalities are involved, the economic question is whether the
elimination of property rights in highly successful user interfaces is the
best approach. As the voluminous literature on the Coase theorem, and
indeed the original Coase article, make clear,136 contract is a superior
alternative where transactions costs do not preclude bargaining, including
situations where copyright has customarily been used.137 We have already
seen that the institution of contract has an impressive record in the
attachment product world where hundreds, often thousands, of
application software firms are involved.138
In the replacement product world, the number of firms involved with
respect to a particular class of products is necessarily very much smaller
and therefore there is no substantial barrier to bargaining. If the prior
innovating firm believes that costs to users (such as training costs) would
fall by promoting identical user interfaces among competing products,
then there are no obvious barriers to concluding the appropriate
contractual arrangements either directly with competing firms or through
the standardization process. If the cost savings to users are great enough,
the innovative firm would have an incentive to capture some of them by
an inclusive (sometimes called “open “) strategy. Critics might object that
the innovative firm would gain a disproportionate share of whatever
financial benefits accrue to the software industry from such a form of
though the individual elements of the compilation are not. See the definition of
“compilation” in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“a work formed by the collection and assembly of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way
that the work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship”); Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991): Kregos v. Associated Press,
937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); and Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir.
1989). Similarly, even though common geometric shapes may not be copyrightable, their
arrangement may be. See North Coast Industries v. Jason Maxwell, 972 F.2d 1031, 1035
(9th Cir. 1992).
135 See discussion supra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
136 Coase, supra note 198.
137 Landes, supra note 47 at 105-106.
138 See discussion supra note 106-113 and accompanying text.
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standardization. While that might be true (and if so would be a reward to
innovation), the distribution of profits would in the normal case have no
effect on the achievement of the resulting cost reduction to users and to
the economy as a whole.
IX. Beyond Me-too Copying
Although me-too copying cannot be defended on economic grounds,
more complicated economic issues arise in two other cases: copying a
competitor’s application program as a base or kernel for an improved
product (previously referred to as the improvement case), and
intermediate copying of an operating system interface in order to write a
new application program.
Both the me-too and the improvement cases involve one of the
fundamental distinctions in copyright law. The Supreme Court in 1994
dealt briefly in the Campbell case with a distinction between a
“transformative” and a “substitutive” use.139 The Court contrasted
“commercial use [that] amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an
original” and “serves as a market replacement for it” with use that is
“transformative.”140 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion called the former
use “substitutive.”141 Earlier, in the Sony case, the Supreme Court had
distinguished between a “productive” and a “unproductive” use.142 This
distinction, whatever the exact words chosen, is well established in the
law and economics literature,143 and is implicit in the fair use provisions of
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which make “the purpose and character
of the use” and “the effect of the use upon the potential market for and
value of the copyrighted work” two of the four statutory fair use factors.
Under the Campbell test, me-too copying is a substitutive use; its
purpose is to replace an existing product with a substantially similar
139

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
Id. at 1171. (Emphasis supplied)
141 Id. at 1180, 1181 (Emphasis supplied)
142 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n. 40 (1983) (emphasis
supplied) and id., dissenting opinion, 457, 478-479.
143 See Landes and Posner, supra note 47 at 360, distinguishing between a
“productive” and a “reproductive” use. (“A productive use is one that lowers the cost of
expression and tends to increase the number of works, while a reproductive one simply
increases the number of ‘copies’ of a given work, reduces the gross profits of the author,
and reduces the incentives to create works.”) And see the application of this distinction
in Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. of Legal Stud. 67 (1992). See the use
of the term “transformative” in Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990).
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product. But suppose that the purpose of copying is to bring a better
application program product to the market by using the existing product
as a base or kernel on which to build enhanced or additional features.
Obviously a rule treating such a use as transformative and hence allowing
the copying could lead to abuse, and therefore one has to assume for
purposes of analysis that the enhanced or additional features are of major
importance and not merely a subterfuge for permitting me-too copying.
More specifically, one has to assume that the value added by the
improvement constitutes at least a major portion of the value of the new
product because otherwise too pat a formula for avoiding the rule against
me-too copying would be created. But if the improvement is truly
important and creates a major portion of the value of the new product,
then the issue is squarely posed. Should this form of copying be treated as
copyright infringement or as fair use? Note that here the
attachment/replacement distinction is not particularly helpful because,
while the purpose is to replace the copied product, the situation bears
some semblance of attachment in the sense that the follow-on firm adds
something of value from the standpoint of users.
In such circumstances the fourth statutory fair use factor concerning
the effect “upon the potential market for and value of the copyrighted
work” surely argues for the use being infringing. On the other hand,
failure to allow copying might have the cost of unduly hampering future
innovation, depending on whether the copying was necessary to bring a
new and better product to the market. To that extent the use is
transformative under the first fair use factor involving “purpose and
character of the use.” Perhaps it will be a relatively rare case in which
there were no physical alternatives to copying; normally the enhanced or
new features could have been added to a new base or kernel. The analogy
to the rule implementing the expression/idea dichotomy (concerning
whether there is one or several ways of implementing an idea) is
suggestive of a possible rule. In any case, the argument for permitting
copying is unlikely to be that copying is physically necessary but rather
that it is necessary in order to be able to attract existing users to the new
product.144 Thus, the issue is whether wholesale copying of an existing
application program where necessary from a marketing point of view to
144

If what is being copied can be said to be public domain industry conventions, as
opposed to a program as a whole or program elements that are quantitatively or
qualitatively significant, then copying is already permitted. See the discussion of
industry conventions, supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
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bring a substantially improved application program successfully to
market should be permitted.145
Ultimately the economic choice for copyright law in the case just
postulated boils down to the effect on incentives for innovation versus the
effect on future innovation. Since the new replacement product competes
with the old and may in fact displace it from the market, the negative
effect on incentives for innovation of a rule permitting copying is clear. On
the other hand, the beneficial effect of such a rule on future innovation is
equally clear.
Even if one were to carve out an exception to copyright protection in
de facto standard cases in order to encourage future innovation, a court
would still have to look at the facts of the particular case. Specifically, the
court would have to decide how much innovation would be required in
the follow-on product relative to the copied features in order to justify an
exception to copyright protection. If one adopts the view articulated above
that we should look solely to intellectual property principles, seeking to
balance present and future innovation (leaving competition issues to the
antitrust laws),146 then minor improvements in the follow-on product
should not be enough and therefore the court would have to inquire as to
that balance in resolving a claim of infringement. In contrast, Judge
Keeton, in both his Paperback and Borland decisions, refused to look at that
question where significant features of the copyrighted program were
copied.147
Even if this approach might lead one to permit copying in the
postulated circumstances of major improvements to a de facto standard
program, two important considerations point in the opposite direction.
The first consideration derives from the notion of competition among
145

In principle, the same issue could arise in the case of the copying of an operating
system program in order to offer an improved operating system program. Here,
however, the criterion of the improvement being of major importance in the sense of
constituting at least a major portion of the value of the new product is unlikely to be met
because of the complexity of operating system programs. Hence, copying of operating
system programs appears likely to constitute a substitutive use.
With regard to either operating system or application programs one can make the
legal argument that even a transformative upgrade violates the copyright owner’s
exclusive right under § 106 to prepare derivative works, which in the case of software
presumably includes upgrades (e.g., version 3.0 for version 2.0).
146 See discussion supra note 130and accompanying text.
147 Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 70 (D.
Mass. 1990); Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78, 97-98 and
799 F. Supp. 203, 220-222 (D. Mass. 1992).
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standards. The tendency of a rule permitting copying would be to drive
the entire marketplace for a particular kind of application program toward
coalescence around the standard that first became popular in the
marketplace. It would increase any “tipping” tendency of standards and
indeed might do so prematurely.148 A rule prohibiting copying, in
contrast, is more likely to lead to competing standards in the marketplace.
As previously argued, competition among standards has worked and may
well have the effect of inducing even more rapid progress in performance
and technical innovation.149
The second consideration is perhaps more subtle. The effect of a rule
calling on the courts in each particular case to determine whether copying
of an application program was, under the Campbell case, transformative or
substitutive would greatly reduce certainty as to intellectual property
rights. In many cases it would require litigation to make the
determination.150 The consequences of uncertainty in property rights are
manifold. But one consequence warrants particular attention.
When property rights are clear, a property rule of remedies can
produce important benefits. If the original innovator can enjoin the
copying, then the property rights are clear and the parties will have an
incentive to deal with each other through contract. The follow-on
competitor will have an obvious incentive to seek a license from the
copyright owner. Less obviously, but perhaps even more important, the
original innovator will have an incentive to contract with the follow-on
competitor if the improvement is truly important. If incorporating the
improvement would lead to increased sales (including perhaps higher
prices), then there is a gain that both parties will have an incentive to
realize through contract.151
One can object that because there are, by hypothesis, only two parties
to the negotiation, a type of bilateral monopoly is present, strategic
bargaining behavior is likely over how the gain is to be shared, and in the
end no agreement may be reached. Still, the software world is replete with
148

It would thus exacerbate any tendency toward tipping and toward premature
coalescence on de facto standards that some have purported to find. See supra notes 114116 and accompanying text and note 124.
149 See discussion of competition among standards supra notes 106-113 and
accompanying text.
150 D.C. Toedt, Oh, Pretty Woman: Muddying Software Copyright Even Further with
‘Transformative Fair Use,’ Computer Lawyer 15, Vol. 11, No. 6 (June 1994).
151 See discussion of contractual solutions supra note 106-113 and accompanying
text.
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such agreements. Many forms of such agreement fill the newspapers and
trade press: licenses, joint ventures, strategic alliances and even
acquisitions. The important point is that the negotiation of such
agreements, good for parties and users alike, is simpler and more likely to
achieve success where property rights are clear. Moreover, the nature of
the parties who are negotiating, being business firms all involved in
writing software, means that transactions costs are likely to be low.152
A second form of copying beyond the me-too situation warranting
analysis, but that is beyond the scope of this article, is intermediate
copying of an operating system interface (and, by analogy, copying of an
application program interface) in order to write a wholly new application
program. Unlike the case of copying of a competing product to launch an
improved version where the attachment-replacement distinction is
clouded, this is clearly a case of attachment. By hypothesis, the new
application program does not compete with the operating system whose
interface is the subject of the intermediate copying. Moreover, the balance
in the Campbell transformative-substitutive test shifts sharply toward the
transformative side.
This form of copying normally involves what is known as the
decompilation, or disassembly, form of reverse engineering. The notion is
that what is involved is intermediate copying only in order to be able to
write independent programming so that the new application product will
attach to the operating system. The assumption is that the final version of
the new product will not include any of the protected expression in the
copied program. The intermediate copying is, by hypothesis, required to
decompile, or disassemble, object code in order to be able to obtain source
code so that the application program firm will be able to write its own
program to permit attachment.
How often such decompilation is necessary from the standpoint of
application software firms is not clear because operating system firms
have an incentive to make the requisite interface information available,
152

This is not a situation where the parties are dispersed, as in cases involving
consumers or in the oft-cited environmental harm situation, where high transactions
costs make contracting less efficient. Moreover, although the case of the lone software
writer who is able single-handedly to improve major software programs commands
romantic appeal, economic incentives lead most software engineers to collaborate in
firms. Hence the universe of potential contracting parties is limited and knowable and
therefore transactions costs are relatively low. Finally, the problem that may have been
involved in the Campbell case, namely, that the owner of the song copyright may have
refused on principle (or perhaps out of prejudice) to negotiate with the black rap artists
who wanted to produce the parody, is less likely to be presented in the software context.
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either directly or by manuals or in other ways, in order to increase the
number of application programs that run on its operating system.
However, in connection with situations like Sega/Accolade, a video game
case,153 some have argued that some intermediate copying may
nonetheless be necessary to facilitate attachment.
A general exception for the decompilation form of reverse engineering
could present a serious backdoor opening for outright wholesale copying.
The issue therefore received considerable attention in the drafting of the
European Union’s software directive where a Council Directive permitted
it in circumstances where “indispensable to obtain the information
necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs,” but imposed, among several
restrictions, the prohibition of any decompilation for the purpose of
developing a “substantially similar” program.154 While the issue of
intermediate copying is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that the
twin distinctions between attachment and replacement and between
transformative and substitutive uses provide key concepts for the analysis
of particular factual situations.155
X. Software-Related Patents
Software may benefit from patent was well as copyright protection.156
However, patent protection differs not just in theory but in scope and
content from copyright protection. A 1992 advisory commission
concluded that the two forms of protection “cover different aspects of an
153

Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). See also
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
154 Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 442, Article 6(1) and 6(2)(c).
155 The issue of intermediate copying can also arise in the case, discussed earlier in
the text, of the follow-on application program firm that seeks to develop an improvement
for a competitor’s existing application program. In order to determine what part of the
existing program to include in its own follow-on program, it must first understand that
program, which may lead it to decompile object code. This also raises the question,
sometimes discussed, of whether it is permissible to engage in intermediate copying in
order to understand and use the ideas (as opposed to the expression) in a program. For a
skeptical view of the need for such intermediate copying in view of alternative means of
learning those ideas, see Miller, supra note 5 at 1015 n. 182.
156 For a summary of the history leading to patent protection for software, see Peter
B. Maggs, John T. Soma and James A. Sprowl, Computer Law 185-186 (1992). See also
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), including the dissent by Justice Stevens at 193.
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article, and thus do not conflict with each other.”157 Although this
statement should not be read to imply that there is no overlap whatever in
what is protected, it is certainly true that patents afford protection in a
completely different way.158
Copyright protects expression, which means both software code and
certain non-literal elements, whereas patents protect invention. Copyright
does not protect ideas. Though it is sometimes assumed in some copyright
literature that patents do protect ideas, this is true only in a quite loose
and general way. For example, patents do not protect abstract ideas;
rather, they protect ideas only when a practical manifestation for those
ideas has been shown by the patent applicant.159 Moreover, patents
protect only novel, useful and nonobvious ideas.160 Finally, the Supreme
Court has said that mathematical algorithms are may not be patented, a
qualification that has significance for patent protection in the case of
software.161 It is consequently generally believed that computer software
can qualify for patent protection only to the extent that the software
interacts with or acts upon the hardware of a computer or some other
157

Advisory Commission of Patent Law Reform, A Report to the Secretary of
Commerce 146 (Aug. 1992) (hereafter “Advisory Commission Report”). See Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
158 The assumptions of the two systems as to their purposes differ. Goldstein
observes that copyright strives for “the widest possible differentiation...by protecting all
original expressions, however little they differ from earlier works, as long as they do not
infringe earlier works.” He states that patent law “reflects the belief that society’s interest
in technological advance will best be served by granting protection only to inventions
that represent substantial advances over the prior art.” Hence, “copyright law sets a low
standard for protection and attaches a correspondingly thin array of rights to the works
protected” whereas patent law “set[s] the standards and level of protection high....” Paul
Goldstein, Copyright § 2.15 (1989). On the relation between copyright and patent
protection for software, see Joint Overlap Study 48-89.
159 The utility requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 101, together with the enablement and best
mode requirements, 35 U.S.C. § 112, assure that patents are not granted for abstract ideas.
160 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102.
161 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 1 (1981). See Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 1.03[6]
(1993). The pto has taken the position that only mathematical algorithms are excepted
from patentability “since any process is an ‘algorithm’ in the sense that it is a step-by-step
procedure to arrive at a given result.” Patentable Subject Matter, Mathematical
Algorithms and Computer Programs, 1106 Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark
Office 5 (Sept. 5, 1989), reprinted in Maggs, Soma and Sprowl, supra note 156 at 264, 266.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the significance of the mathematical algorithm
exclusion is declining, and indeed the reason for the exclusion is not clear if the other
criteria for patentability are met, namely, that the algorithm is novel, useful and
nonobvious and is not an abstract idea.
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apparatus. As the 1992 advisory commission stated, “[A]though computer
program-related inventions use mathematics or can be understood in
terms of mathematics...,patents for computer-related inventions are
directed to performing commercial and technological methods or
processes or to apparatus using programs to control the operation of
hardware.”162 These considerations explain why patents involving
software are often referred to as software-related patents and why most
software claims today are drafted as “apparatus claims” so that it is the
program’s effect on the “apparatus” (which may be a computer or part of
a computer), rather than the code itself, that is being claimed.163
The hardware-related aspect of software-related patents also follows in
part, though not necessarily inescapably, from the legal requirement that
utility patents can be granted only on a “process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter.”164 A software-related patent therefore normally
covers either a “process” (which would normally imply some apparatus
upon which the process operates) or a “machine” as it is governed by
software. In that sense one could say that it is not the software code as
such that is patented or, alternatively, one could say that one cannot
obtain a patent on software standing alone.
Despite these limitations a computer software firm setting out today to
write new software must take into consideration the possibility that it will
be limited in what it can do by both patents and copyrights belonging to a
prior innovator. But there is a crucial difference between patents and
copyrights. Since independent creation is a complete defense to copyright
infringement actions, a firm does not have to worry about copyrights
belonging to others so long as it does its own work.165 For patents,
162

See John P. Sumer, The Copyright/Patent Interface: Patent Protection for the
Structure of Program Code, 30 Jurimetrics 107, 112 (1989).
163 See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Notice Interpreting In re
Iwahashi (Fed. Cir. 1989), 1112 Official Gazette of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office 16 (March 13, 1990), reprinted in Maggs, Soma and Sprowl, supra note
156 at 280. See also Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corzonix Corp., 958 F.2d
1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). As Clapes observes, “What salvaged [the] patent in [Diamond v.
Diehr] was the fact that the process claimed...was not a mathematical process but an
industrial process: the application of computers to curing rubber in a particular way. The
significance of that distinction has not be lost on patent lawyers. Thousands of softwarerelated patents have been filed.... all based on methods of accomplishing a real-world
result by using a computer under the control of a program.” Clapes, supra note 54 at 32.
164 35 U.S.C. § 101.
165 Two practical caveats to the statement in the text: (1) there is anecdotal evidence
that employees under pressure from management may copy to meet deadlines; and (2)
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independent creation is not a defense and therefore a patent search is
prudent, at least before commencing marketing.
In principle, the economic issues involved in software-related patents
raise no economic issues other than those presented by patents
generally.166 However, the actual administration of the system for
examining software-related patent applications has defects that are
generally acknowledged and that do raise the possibility that softwarerelated patents unduly favor present innovation at the expense of future
innovation. The possibility of a departure from an optimal balance
between innovation today and innovation tomorrow arises from the
failure of the Patent and Trademark Office (pto) to respond adequately to
the explosive growth in software and to the high degree of innovation in
the industry, particularly in its early years. Since patent applications are
normally unopposed and the proceedings are secret, the effectiveness of
the examining process in assuring that the requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness are met depends crucially not just on the skill of the
examiner but also on the quality and accessibility of the files available to
the examiner. For example, an examiner can normally determine that an
application fails to meet these criteria only by finding pertinent prior art in
the pto files.167 The 1992 Advisory Commission particularly criticized the
unavailability and inaccessibility of non-patent technical software
since access plus substantial similarity is sufficient to prove copyright infringement,
Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1988), it is possible that a new program may
engender an infringement action where an employee has had access, even though that
employee intended to do his own work. Moreover, for popular mass-market programs,
the risk is that access may be presumed. See discussion supra note 61. See also the
concept of subconscious infringement in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Inc.,
722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
166 Important economic aspects of patent law are analyzed in Dam, Economic
Underpinnings.
167 These files are generally regarded as inadequate with respect to prior art other
than prior patents. To be sure, the patent applicant is required to draw prior art of which
he is aware to the attention of the pto, 37 C.F.R. 1.56, but since there is a good deal of
reinventing of the software wheel, this requirement may be less effective than in other
fields. These and similar concerns were ventilated at length in software patent hearings
held by the Patent and Trademark Office in 1994. Among the factors cited in the Notice of
Hearings as contributing to difficulties in uncovering prior art were (1) “Early programming techniques were not well documented or publicly available,” (2) “Locating
and obtaining the most relevant prior art is extremely difficult, due to the widely diverse
nature of processes that have been implemented by computer software-related systems;”
and (3) “Software is not documented in a consistent, readily understandable format....”
58 Fed. Reg. 66347, 66351 (Dec. 20, 1993).
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literature of the kind that might reveal prior art. It equally criticized
inadequacies in classification and indexing of both patent and non-patent
software literature. The Commission made a series of recommendations
bearing on these issues as well as on recruitment and training of
examiners in the software area.168
Although it may be true that in many industries patents are frequently
issued that turn out, in subsequent litigation, to be invalid for lack of
novelty or for obviousness, the fact that this problem appears to be much
more severe with respect to software-related patents creates a special
problem of deterring software innovation. Even though in non-software
industries the prospect of having to resort to litigation to launch a product
covered by a dubious patent is a deterrent, software has several
characteristics that could make the deterrent more severe if the incidence
of invalid software-related patents is especially high. One is that the
software industry, despite its increasing maturity, still involves thousands
of firms, many quite small,169 and therefore the feasibility of litigation for
many follow-on competitors is problematical. Second, many software
programs are sufficiently complex that they may potentially raise
infringement issues under many patents.170
For these reasons many smaller software firms have criticized the
institution of software-related patents as creating special risks not present,
or at least not so common, in other industries, such as “not being able to
find the patents which apply to a program being developed; not being
able to determine if the patent applies to a particular program [and] not
being able to find prior art (e.g., evidence that a technique had been
previously used although not published).”171 In late 1993 the
168

Advisory Commission Report 33-34.
Id. at 145.
170 See statement of Daniel Brickman, in Robert Patrick Merges, Patent Law and
Policy 88 (1992), and statement of Jerry Baker, Public Hearing of Use of the Patent System
to Protect Software-Related Inventions (pto, Jan. 26, 1994) (“pto Software Hearings”). The
protracted length of some patent litigation may produce a further problem, especially in
view of the relatively short live of some software products.
171 Advisory Commission 147. The quotation is a summary by the Commission of
complaints made in submissions to it. Another complaint was that certainty could not be
achieved without litigation that was “costly in both time and money.” Ibid.
The familiar concern of economists about the length of patent protection, see Dam,
Economic Underpinnings at 257-259, might be thought to play a special role with respect
to software, in view of the rapid evolution of the state of the software art. While patent
doctrine plays an important role in determining the breadth of patent protection, it plays
no role with respect to length since the term is fixed by statute. Ibid. It is worth recalling
that many contemporary software “innovations” were actually invented decades ago but
169
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announcement of the issuance of a multimedia search and retrieval patent
gave rise to widespread protests on the ground that the technology was
obvious and had been for decades. Although the pto Commissioner
himself ordered reexamination and all forty-one claims were subsequently
rejected on grounds of obviousness or lack of novelty,172 the incident
highlighted the prior art problems facing the software patent industry. To
the extent that the patent system thus fails to work adequately, it cannot
achieve an economic balance in the stream of innovation. But these
problems are not inherent in software-related patents. On the contrary, the
Advisory Commission’s recommendations would go a long way toward
remedying this weakness, and the pto has set out to implement many of
these recommendations.173 Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
patent system can be made as rational in the software industry as in other
technical areas.174
are only becoming popular today due to the tremendous increase in computer power that
facilitates their implementation. See statement of Lee Hollaar , pto Software Hearings
(Jan. 26, 1994). In any event, the length of protection has not been a major concern in
recent complaints about software-related patents. (The statutory period is being changed
from seventeen years from issue to twenty years from filing as the result of recent trade
negotiations.)
172 See pto, Reexamination, BNA Patent, Trademark & Copyright J. 485 (March 31,
1994).
173 On improvements in pto software patenting procedures, see 47 bna Patent,
Trademark & Copyright Journal 357, 504 (1994). In addition, an institution known as the
Software Patent Institute has been established to develop a database of software prior art,
particularly unpatented prior art, to be available to the public and the pto.
174 Much of the criticism of software-related patents goes not to the efficacy of patent
examination but rather stems from the notion that the great bulk of software-related
patents go to large firms and therefore the institution of software-related patents
hampers small firm innovation. Whatever the incidence of patent applications by size of
firm in such patent applications relative to patent applications in other industries may be,
it is clear that software-related patents are sometimes crucial for small firms in
maintaining their market position against larger rivals. One illustration is a recent case
involving compression technology, Stac Electronics v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-93-0413-ER
(C.D. Cal.), in which Stac received an award of $120million in compensatory damages
against Microsoft and, in a subsequent settlement involving Stac’s claim and a successful
Microsoft’s claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, Stac received financial payments,
a capital infusion and a paid-up cross license from Microsoft. See Microsoft and Stac
Settle, Computer Lawyer 25 (June 1994); and James W. Morando and Christian H. Nadan,
Do Software Patents ‘Stac’ the Deck Against the Competition, Computer Lawyer 1 (April
1994). The Stac illustration also shows why software-related patents may be essential for
small firms seeking financing of their growth; without patents, their prime assets may be
their employees, who of course are not pledgable.
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XI. Sui Generis Alternatives to Copyright and Patent Protection
An alternative to the copyright and patent systems for protecting
software could perhaps be provided by some third system yet to be
adopted. Proposals for such third systems usually are referred to under
the heading of sui generis protection. The central concept behind the sui
generis approach is that intellectual property protection for a particular
sphere of economic activity should be by special legislation tailored to that
sphere. Such proposals have been made from time to time for computer
software, usually as an alternative to copyright protection. The
fundamental argument for a sui generis approach is simply that since
neither the copyright nor the patent systems were created with software in
mind, it should be possible to create a new system that fits the special
nature of software better. This argument, however, proves too much for it
would lead to the creation of a separate sui generis system for every new
technology, an approach rejected for nearly every new technology over
the last two hundred years.175 Copyright was created without
photography in mind, and patent without biotechnology in mind. Yet it
would surely make little sense to subject all new technologies to the
legislative process for the creation of its own tailored system, particularly
in the early years of a technology when its shape and dynamic are still
unclear. Although the sui generis approach thus runs contrary to a
sensible tradition, it deserves to be assessed on its own merits.
The fundamental economic problem with a sui generis approach has to
do with property rights. Both copyrights and patents are property
rights.176 As with rights in tangible property, a property rights system
works best when rights are specifically demarcated and circumscribed.
That objective is most clearly seen with real property, where metes and
bounds descriptions, plats, surveys and the like are means to achieve that
objective. In the case of some intangible personal property, especially
intellectual property, that objective cannot be fully achieved for a wide
175

For exceptions see the discussion of the sui generis system for semiconducter
chips, infra notes 179-190and accompanying text, and several statutes involving plants,
the Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. § 161et seq. and the Plant Variety Protection Act of
1977 U.S.C. § 2321et seq. The 1930 statute is perhaps not an exception for it largely
applied existing patent law to certain plants and to that extent is analogous to extending
copyright to new technologies. An attempt by a state to prohibit direct molding of boat
hulls, arguably a kind of sui generis protection, was struck down in Bonito Boat, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
176 For copyrights, see discussion supra note 74 and accompanying text. For patents,
see Economic Underpinnings, 253.
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variety of definitional and administrative reasons. Nonetheless, gray areas
and penumbras, where the question of ownership has to be left for
negotiation and litigation, reduce the certainty of ownership and therefore
the economic efficiency of intellectual property rights.177
Some lack of definition in intellectual property rights is therefore an
inevitable consequence of their very lack of tangibility. They cannot be
physically measured, marked or sequestered. Thus, the real question
about a sui generis approach boils down to whether a specific legislative
approach or the more general judicial approach based on a more generic
statute, such as the copyright and patent statutes, provides more certainty
and is, in general, more efficient. Although it would probably be a mistake
to prefer one over the other for all realms of human activity, there are a
number of general reasons for preferring the judicial over the legislative
approach, stemming essentially from differences between the adjudicatory
and legislative processes.178
In the computer software arena this issue takes on special importance
because of rapid technological change and the alleged incompetence of the
judiciary to understand the underlying technology, much less the
incessant changes in it. Among the factors therefore that need to be
investigated in fully evaluating a sui generis approach for computer
software, in addition to generic differences between the two branches, are
the relative competence of Congress and the Federal judiciary to
understand computer-related technologies, to adapt rules to change, and
to be precise about rules in order to define and circumscribe property
rights.
These large and complex issues transcend the bounds of this article,
but it is worth examining the one instance where a sui generis approach to
177

Negotiation need not necessarily be inefficient where there is a small number of
parties involved, as is normally the case with real property boundaries. In software it
may not be clear who the contending parties are until late in the history of a particular set
of innovations. Not only may transactions costs therefore be higher but that fact interacts
with the appropriability problem to increase the risk facing an innovator and hence to
reduce the prospective risk-adjusted return for any prospective research and
development investment. Moreover, by the time an actual dispute arises, a form of
bilateral monopoly may have been created, raising transactions costs and enhancing the
likelihood of litigation. While these problems all exist in principle, their importance in
the software world whenever firms using competing technologies are readily identifiable
should, however, not be exaggerated for the reasons discussed infra notes 106-113and
accompanying text.
178 These general reasons have been extensively discussed elsewhere. See Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 523-536 (4th ed. 1992), and citations therein.
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intellectual property protection has been used in a field of computerrelated technology. That is the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,
which protects mask works used in the manufacture of semiconductor
chips.179 This statute has not been considered a great success, to say the
least. Two principal reasons for its relative lack of success may be
highlighted.
One reason is that the Congress tried to craft a statute that
simultaneously granted protection and withheld it in a core area—reverse
engineering. Not only was reproduction of mask works specifically
permitted for the purpose of “teaching, analyzing or evaluating the
concepts or techniques embodied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic
flow, or organization of components used in the mask work,”180 but the
results of that reverse engineering could be incorporated in the follow-on
firm’s own products.181 So long as the follow-on firm maintained an
appropriate “paper trail” concerning the steps taken in its reverse
engineering to show that it had done some independent work, it could sell
a chip copied heavily from the innovator’s chip, thereby opening a safe
passage for clever pirates.182 It can be argued that this giving with one
hand, while taking away with the other, is characteristic of detailed
legislation in view of the role of conflicting interest groups, logrolling and
179

17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914. In Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 705 F.
Supp. 491, 494 (S.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 977 F.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the trial court said
that the Act was not sui generis legislation because it was “based upon concepts derived
from the copyright law.” However, the statute constituted a specific rejection of the
copyright statute as the operative basis for protection and therefore for present purposes
must be considered sui generis protection.
180 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1).
181 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2).
182 Brooktree v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The
Brooktree case establishes a “substantially identical” standard of infringement once the
appropriate paper trail is shown by the defendant. See the approved jury instructions,
977 F.2d at 1567. Rauch argues that the reverse engineering exception slowed innovation
because the follow-on competitor lacks an “incentive to develop a new solution”: “So
long as the competitor can create a paper trail, the competitor is free to use the unique
structures of the first chip. The innovator, knowing in advance that new design is likely
to be appropriated, will discontinue innovative work. The return on investment can no
longer be realized when the result is free for the taking.” John G. Rauch, The Realities of
our Time: The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and the Evolution of the
Semiconductor Industry, 75 J. of Pat. and Trademark Office Soc. 93, 123 (1993).
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other aspects of the Congressional process.183 The fundamental question,
to which no conclusive a priori answer can be given, is whether the
Federal judicial process is not more likely to lead to cleaner decisions,
freer of vitiating compromises. It is true that the very structure of the
Federal judiciary leads to conflicts in circuits, which we now experience in
copyright law between the Whelan and Computer Associates approaches to
the scope of non-literal protection.184 Even if the conflicts in circuits lead to
Supreme Court review, the experience in related fields such as antitrust
does not lead to confidence that the Supreme Court will set down clear
rules for the future.185 Part of the reason lies in the nature of a multimember court,186 but another part no doubt has to do with the relative
lack of specialization in the Supreme Court’s docket. The situation with
respect to patent protection, where the creation of the Federal Circuit in
1982, which has become de facto the supreme court of patents, has led to
some improvement in the consistency and professionalism of patent
decisions.187
A second reason for the 1984 Act’s shortcomings was that technology
outpaced the Congress. Since 1984 the methods of the industry have
fundamentally changed, as individual chips have become enormously
more complicated and as manufacturing process technologies have
consequently become less standard among firms but more crucial to
success. The 1992 Patent Advisory Commission found that the “some of
the basic definitions [of the Act] are already obsolete, leaving important
parts of mask work technology outside the protection of that
legislation.”188 Moreover, according to Rauch, whereas in 1984 simple
photography of another’s chip was the essential method of piracy,
photography alone can no longer suffice unless the pirate has the same
process technologies as the innovating firm. The result is that the pirate is
able to use reverse engineering, complete with a contrived paper trail
183

On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that even some of the innovating
leaders of the semiconductor industry, such as Intel, favored the reverse engineering
exception. Ibid.
184 See discussion supra notes 70-85 and accompanying texts.
185 See, e.g., the discussion of the continuing uncertainty with respect to the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in
an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 289.
186 There are, of course, reasons explained in the literature on public choice why nine
judges may find it difficult to articulate clear rules even within majority opinions. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 811-831 (1982).
187 Dam, Economic Underpinnings 269-270 and authorities cited therein.
188 Advisory Commission Report 151.
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(indeed, a paper trail that is likely to be better than that of a legitimate
innovator doing design work on a graphics workstation), and hence as a
practical matter the 1984 Act no longer provides substantial protection.189
The important point is not whether Rauch is right on the facts (though
his argument certainly seems plausible). Rather it is that Congress has not
readdressed the issue to keep pace with technological change. Thus, the
usefulness of sui generis legislation in an industry characterized by rapid
technological change is called into question by the experience under the
1984 Act.190
A further quite practical objection to sui generis protection is that an
abandonment of patent and copyright protection in favor of a new sui
generis approach would leave the U.S. software industry seriously
exposed abroad. National patent and copyright systems are based on a
network of treaty obligations that assure more or less worldwide
protection (subject to piracy and the failure of some countries to join this
worldwide system). The 1992 Advisory Commission consequently
concluded that the replacement of this international network, which
would no longer operate to the extent that the United States abolished
patent and copyright protection, by a new one based on sui generis
legislation would take too long and be too uncertain to be workable: “Sui
generis laws would require new, separately negotiated treaties, and
international recognition of the sui generis protection would be limited or
nonexistent until the lengthy process of treaty negotiation could be
completed, if ever.”191 Furthermore, the recently adopted trips agreement,
negotiated in the framework of the gatt Uruguay round, requires
189

Rauch, supra note 182.
Posner, supra note 178 at 53 l, points out:
This [majority vote] requirement makes legislative enactment a difficult and
time-consuming process because of the transaction costs involved in getting
agreement among a large number of individuals. Once a statute is passed, it is
unlikely, given the press of other legislative business, to be substantially altered or
repealed.
See also id. at 531 n. 2.
191 Advisory Commission Report 151. The World Intellectual Property Organization
sponsored a sui generis treaty that was agreed to by forty countries in 1989, but the
United States refused to sign because of what it regarded as inadequate protection.
Donald J. Chisum and Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property Law §
6D[2][c] (1992). As of January 1, 1994, only ten countries had become a party and neither
of the two top chip-producing countries (Japan and the United States) had become party.
World Intellectual Property Organization, Copyright 14 (Jan. 1994).
190
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signatories to maintain copyright protection.192 Part of moving to sui
generis protection would therefore have to be a renegotiation of the trips
agreement.193
Whatever the shortcomings in the competence of general patent and
copyright law to deal with complex technologies (and competence in
complex technologies certainly cannot be advanced as a particular
strength of the Congress), the Federal judiciary has shown not only a
willingness to grapple with detailed computer software issues, but also a
remarkable ability to evolve in its approach as the software industry
evolves. As we have seen in one specific field, the idea/expression
distinction, one can perceive three generations of judicial opinions in the
relatively short period that the 1984 sui generis Chip Protection Act has
languished on the statute books.194
XII. Conclusions
The central issue confronted in this article has been what economic
analysis has to offer to the field of intellectual property protection for
computer software. An economic approach to intellectual property law is
no doubt in its infancy195 and therefore an approach to protection for a
particular industry, such as computer software, must necessarily be
tentative. Some relatively clear conclusions nonetheless emerge. First,
existing copyright and patent law provides a sound basis for an
economically efficient system of protection. Second, the copyright law as
currently applied deals adequately with the appropriability problem,
without creating significant monopoly or rent-seeking problems. Third,
copyright law provides a sound basis for preserving a balance between
innovation today and innovation tomorrow, though the need for
192

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 81

(1994).
193

A further practical objection to a sui generis approach is that now that software is
a well-established industry with thousands of firms, a switch in the United States would
require a costly restructuring of innumerable complex licensing and other contractual
relations based on traditional copyright and patent protection.
194 See discussion supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. To be sure, the second
and third generation precedents overlap in time but that circumstance suggests another
characteristic of the Federal judicial approach—the ability through a hierarchy of courts
to obtain resolution between conflicting precedents. Of course, that process also takes
time, which is costly when the definition of property rights is at stake.
195 See, however, the various articles by Friedman, Kitch, Landes, Menell, Merges,
Posner, and others cited in this article and in Dam, Economic Underpinnings.
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achieving such a balance does not always appear clearly in either the case
law or the literature.
These sanguine conclusions concerning copyright depend crucially,
however, on preservation of the distinctions between attachment and
replacement and between transformative and substitutive uses,
distinctions that do not always emerge sufficiently clearly in the legal
literature on software.
Though patent protection for software-related inventions has
substantially different coverage from software copyrights, softwarerelated patents are found to be, in general, economically sound. However,
as actually administered by the pto, the system may not adequately
balance innovation today versus innovation tomorrow because it is
susceptible (until important administrative changes are implemented) to
generating too many invalid patents. A third alternative, sui generis
protection , is briefly examined, but the experience under the 1984 statute
on computer chips, as well as general considerations concerning the
relative competence of the legislative and judicial branches to deal with
rapidly evolving technology, raise serious questions about the desirability
of the sui generis approach. A number of practical objections to enacting
sui generis protection at this relatively late date are also surveyed.

This Working Paper is a preliminary version of an article that will be
published in The Journal of Legal Studies. Readers with comments should
address them to:
Kenneth W. Dam
Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law
The Law School
The University of Chicago
1111 E. 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
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